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The Law of the Platform
Abstract
New digital platform companies are turning everything into an available resource: services,
products, spaces, connections, and knowledge, all of which would otherwise be collecting dust.
Unsurprisingly then, the platform economy defies conventional regulatory theory. Millions of
people are becoming part-time entrepreneurs, disrupting established business models and
entrenched market interests, challenging regulated industries, and turning ideas about
consumption, work, risk, and ownership on their head. Paradoxically, as the digital platform
economy becomes more established, we are also at an all-time high in regulatory permitting,
licensing, and protection. The battle over law in the platform is therefore both conceptual and
highly practical. New business models such as Uber, Airbnb, and Aereo have received massive
amounts of support from venture capitalists but have also received immense pushback from
incumbent stakeholders, regulators, and courts. This article argues that the platform economy is
presenting not only a paradigm shift for business but also for legal theory. The platform
economy does not only disrupt regulated industries but also demands that we inquire into the
logic of their correlated regulations. It requires that we go back to first principles about public
intervention and market innovation. The article thus poses a foundational inquiry: Do the
regulations we have carry over to the platform economy? By unpacking the economic and social
drives for the rise of the platform economy, the article develops a new framework for asking
whether digital disruptions comprise loopholes akin to regulatory arbitrage, most prominently
studied in the tax field, circumvention akin to controversial copyright protection reforms, or
innovation-ripe negative spaces akin to design-around competition in patent law. Bringing
together these different bodies of law, the article offers a contemporary account of the relevance
of regulation for new business models. The article concludes that, as a default, legal disruption
by the platform economy should be viewed as a feature rather than a bug of regulatory limits.
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The best way to predict the future is to invent it. – Alan Kay

INTRODUCTION
The web is the ultimate matchmaker, capitalizer, and economizer. New digital
technologies are turning everything into an available resource: services, products, spaces,
connections, and knowledge, all of which would otherwise be collecting dust. It’s been called the
sharing economy, 1 the disaggregated economy, 2 the peer-2-peer economy (P-2-P), 3 human-tohuman economy (H-2-H), 4 the community marketplace, 5 the on-demand economy, 6 the app
economy, 7 the access economy, 8 the mesh economy, 9 the gig economy, 10 and also, the
Uberization of everything.11 Each of these terms represents an aspect of the digital platform
revolution, but no term completely captures the entire scope of the paradigmatic shift in the ways
we produce, consume, work, finance, and learn. A new wave of starts-ups, relying on digital
platform technology, are connecting people and transforming behavior and relationships outside
of the digital world, closing down on underutilized human, social, and real capital. The lifecycle
of products is being dramatically extended, the time unit of use is vastly shortened, and
connectivity and access is exponentially expanded. These new business models are generating
billions of dollars annually and their growth rates are overwhelming. Most importantly, the
platform economy is radically changing the traditional equilibria of supply and demand, blurring
the lines between owners and users, producers and consumers, workers and contractors, and
transcending the spatial divides of personal and professional, business and home, market and
leisure, friend and client, acquaintance and stranger, public and private. What has previously
1

The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (May 9, 2013).
Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Government Law: The Future of Local Regulation
of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 940 (2015).
3
The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 1.
4
Tom Lowery, Human to Human (H2H) – Collaboration is the New Competition, HUFFINGTON POST: BUS. (Jan. 31,
2014).
5
Carrie Melissa Jones, Uber, Mint, and Square investor Rob Hayes shares what he looks for in community-driven
startups, VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 14, 2015).
6
Kashir Hill, Meet the lawyer taking on Uber and the rest of the on-demand economy, FUSION (Apr. 16, 2015),
http://fusion.net/story/118401/meet-the-lawyer-taking-on-uber-and-the-on-demand-economy/.
7
Robinson Meyer, The App Economy is Now ‘Bigger Than Hollywood’, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 27, 2015).
8
Steve Denning, Three Strategies for Managing the Economy of Access, FORBES: LEADERSHIP (May 2, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2014/05/02/economic-game-change-from-ownership-to-access/.
9
LISA GANSKY, THE MESH: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SHARING 15 (Penguin, ed. 2010).
10
Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 2, at 925.
11
Sunny Freeman, ‘Uberization’ Of Everything Is Happening, But Not Every ‘Uber’ Will Succeed, HUFFINGTON
POST: BUS. (Apr. 1, 2015).
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been non-commodifiable is being brought into the market – whether it be a ride share, a spare
bedroom, a spot on a waitlist, or a lawnmower loan. What has previously been the realm of
personal property is shifting to the realm of access: instead of installing a clunky rabbit ear
antenna to intercept broadcasting, members receive access to thousands of tiny antennas; instead
of purchasing a bicycle, users ride and drop off bicycles at hubs all around the city; and instead
of owning a vacation home, hosts can swap their houses during the holidays.
Unsurprisingly then, the platform economy defies conventional regulatory theory.
Millions of people are becoming part-time entrepreneurs, disrupting established business models
and entrenched market interests, and challenging regulated industries, all while turning ideas
about consumption, work, risk, and ownership on their head. Paradoxically, as the digital
platform economy becomes more established, we are also at an all-time high in regulatory
permitting, licensing, and protection. The battle over law in the platform is, therefore, both
fundamentally conceptual and highly practical. New business models such as Uber, Airbnb, and
Aereo have received massive amounts of support from venture capitalists but have also received
strong pushback from incumbent stakeholders, regulators, and courts. The spectrum of responses
is dramatically broad. While some jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and San Francisco
are positioning themselves as champions of the platform by introducing policies that will aid its
expansion, other legal regimes such as those in New York, Nevada, Florida, and Germany are
introducing new policies to constrain the platform. Around the United States, class actions
against Uber, Lyft, and other platform apps are underway. The scholarly debates are also ridden
with schisms, either celebrating the platform economy as a utopic shift from capitalism to
communal sharing or decrying dystopian effects of the platform of evading existing regulations
and protections.
Despite the tremendous interest that the platform is attracting from regulators and
scholars, thus far the literature has failed to offer a comprehensive account of law in the new
platform economy. Are companies like Uber and Lyft digital clearinghouses connecting
independent drivers-for-hire with customers, or are they employers violating wage-and-hour
laws? Are zoning laws parsing parts of town for short-term rentals still relevant when residential
property owners list their homes on Airbnb? Was Aereo, which went bankrupt following its
recent Supreme Court defeat, a digital antenna rental company, or a service that streams
broadcast content, thereby infringing copyright? Is TaskRabbit just an app to connect people
searching for odd jobs, or a manpower agency that should withhold taxes? Companies such as
Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, Aereo, and TaskRabbit have been running against existing regulations and
the legal battles often turn on how to define the platform business: are these digital companies
service providers or brokers of individualized exchanges? Should they be viewed as merely
enabling intermediaries or robust corporate infrastructures?
This Article argues that the platform economy is presenting not only a paradigm shift for
business but also for legal theory. Consumer protection laws, safety and health regulations,
business permits and licenses, property and zoning laws, and financial services regulations have
all risen dramatically in the past few decades. The reasons for this surge are mixed, ranging from
public welfare and quality control to less benign goals, such as entry restrictions, lobbied for by
incumbent industry actors. Each of these bodies of law is increasingly at odds with bottom-up
online platform businesses that offer new models of connectivity and exchange. The platform

economy does not only disrupt regulated industries but also demands that we inquire into the
logic of their correlated regulations. It requires that we go back to first principles about public
intervention and market innovation, or, what I term, the regulation-innovation nexus.
The Article uncovers the ways in which the internal logic of regulated industries is now
challenged by digital platform businesses. By unpacking the economic and social impetuses for
the rise of the platform economy, the Article develops a new framework for asking whether
digital disruptions comprise loopholes akin to regulatory arbitrage, most prominently studied in
the tax field, circumvention akin to controversial copyright protection reforms, or innovationripe negative spaces akin to design-around competition in patent law. Bringing together these
different bodies of law, the Article offers a contemporary account of the relevance of regulation
for new business models. Providing a new framework for understanding the regulationinnovation nexus, the Article argues that legal disruption by the platform economy should be
viewed as a feature rather than a bug of regulatory limits.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the spectrum of conceptual challenges
presented by third generation digital business models, Web 3.0. The literature about the platform
is binary. At one end are feel-good stories about the revolutionary power of sharing and the easy
rise of micro entrepreneurs and grassroots exchanges, contrasted against doomsday dystopias
about the role of the platform in subverting established protections, unraveling the checks and
balances historically placed to correct the unfairness produced by markets. Transcending this
utopian/dystopian binary, Part II analyzes the technological, economic, and social reasons for the
rise of the platform economy and the ways the platform is changing each stage and aspect of
market transaction costs. First, taking a Coasean perspective, Part IIA develops a novel
taxonomy of ten distinct principles of the platform that together hold the potential to
systematically reduce transaction costs: uber-scale, resurrection of dead capital, tailoring the
transactional unit, the commodification of everything, deal customization, access over
ownership, overhead elimination, reduced barriers to entry, pricing precision, and dynamic
feedback systems. Next, in Part IIB, the Article shifts beyond the classic transaction cost
economic analysis to a behavioral perspective, explaining how preferences are being shaped by
the platform. The section asserts that part of the value produced by the platform lies in its
differentiation from offline traditional exchanges. In other words, it reveals how the platform
economy is not simply competing efficiently over the same markets of regulated industries but
also constituting new markets, norms, and behaviors.
Building upon these understandings of the internal logic of the rise of the platform, Part
III offers a new framework for understanding the range of laws and regulations that platform
companies currently face. The Article shows that the regulatory challenges can be divided into
easy and hard cases. On one end of the spectrum are regulatory restrictions that operate as
barriers to entry, including permitting, occupational licensing, and rate controls. These are easy
cases – regulatory controls that should not be imposed on the platform because they are largely
designed to prevent entry. On the other end are taxation requirements. These are an equally easy
case because they should straightforwardly be extended to the platform, and existing tax law
lends itself to direct application on these new digital market exchanges. The hard cases
encompass what lies in the regulatory spectrum between market entry barriers and the taxation of
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revenues, namely: zoning laws, consumer protection laws, employment and labor laws, and
intellectual property laws. These regulatory fields each have public welfare goals that are
challenged by the shifts in market models, emerging social norms, and unstable preferences.
Moreover, many of the regulatory goals can be achieved by utilizing the technological advances
of the very same business models that are disrupting established structures. Therefore, any
inquiry into the regulation-innovation nexus requires an understanding of the comparative
advantages of public interventions and self-regulation by the platform. Part IV maps these latter
shifts onto concepts from innovation theory and policy. Integrating insights from different fields
of law about regulatory disruption, it considers the continued necessity of certain protections and
examines the rise of self-regulatory practices. The Article demonstrates that the platform
economy is still very much evolving, frequently comes with built-in regulatory devices and
thrives because of definitional defiance. By offering a first schematic treatment of law and the
platform economy, this Article aims to provide scholars and policymakers a framework that
identifies the conditions under which new business models transform economic structures and
how law maps onto those shifts.

I. CECI N’EST PAS UN TAXI: DISRUPTION & DEFINITIONAL DEFIANCE
“In the interest of eliminating bureaucracy, overhead, middlemen and waste, I turned
myself into a corporation.” – Joel Stein, Time Magazine, 2015
A. Web 3.0: The Platform Revolution
Over 10,000 new platform companies have sprouted and mushroomed in less than a
decade, and they continue to pop up daily. The platform economy, while not easy to define or
quantify, is currently valued at $41 billion with predictions of an exponential growth to $110
billion in the next few years. 12 A recent PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) report predicts that
global revenues from the platform sectors could hit $335 billion by 2025. 13 “Like Uber but for
___” pitches for venture capital funding are a daily occurrence. 14 So what’s your business? You
don’t need to open a restaurant to host cooking events; you don’t need to become a taxi driver to
offer paid rides; you don’t need to open a hotel to be a lodging host; you don’t need to start a
moving company to get paid for helping someone relocate. Platform businesses are challenging
conventional industries in every realm, including: hotels (Airbnb; Couchsurfing; Homeaway;
VRBO); office space (Liquid Space; ShareDesk), parking spaces (ParkingPanda; Park Circa);
transportation (Lyft; Sidecar; Uber); restaurants (Eatwith; Feastly; Blue Apron; Munchery); used
clothing (ThredUp); household tools (Open Shed); outdoor gear (Gearcommons); capital
12

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES: THE SHARING ECONOMY 14 (2015),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-the-sharingeconomy.pdf; Sarah Cannon & Lawrence H. Summers, How Uber and the Sharing Economy Can Win Over
Regulators, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/10/how-uber-and-the-sharing-economy-can-winover-regulators/.
13
The sharing economy – sizing the revenue opportunity, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS: UNITED KINGDOM (2015).
14
Kate Cox, Nobody Really Knows What To Do About Regulating The Sharing Economy, THE CONSUMERIST (June
10, 2015).

(Zopa; Prosper; Kickstarter; Bitcoin); broadcasting (Aereo; FilmOn.com); legal services
(Upcounsel); medical services (Healthtap); academic services (Uguru); everyday errands, such
as grocery shopping and laundry (TaskRabbit; Instacart; Airtasker; Washio); and specialized
errands, such as flower delivery (BloomThat), dog-walking (DogVacay), and package delivery
(Shyp).
The platform economy is so diverse in its offerings that to neatly describe its scope is
impractical. There are various ways to slice it. It includes the delivery of services, the sharing of
assets, and the recirculation of goods, yet its rise must be understood in relation to its digital
genealogy. First generation Internet companies connected us to information and knowledge
through search engines like Google and Yahoo. Tim Berners-Lee, best known as the inventor of
the World Wide Web, described the original essence of the Web as a space to collaborate,
communicate, and share information. The second generation, Web 2.0, extended search and
communication, forming online marketplaces like Craigslist, eBay, and Amazon and digital file
sharing services like Netspar and iTunes. These online companies disrupted the publishing
industry, traditional news media, the music industry, and most broadly, the retail industry at
large. Amazon transformed and constricted the bricks-and-mortar bookstores, and file sharing
coupled with digital music and film changed the entertainment industry, effectively killing the
record and video store. Moving beyond retail, the rise of the platform signifies the third
generation of the Internet, Web 3.0, in which technology is transforming the service economy,
allowing greater access to offline exchanges for lower prices (see figure 1). 15 In turn, the
physical infrastructure of offline markets is itself transformed by the technological infrastructure.
Founded in San Francisco in 2007, Airbnb allows private individuals—named hosts—to
rent out their homes or individual rooms to visitors for a short amount of time. 16 Within just a
few years, Airbnb has grown dramatically and is valued at $10 billion with 800,000 properties
listed in more than 190 countries.17 Analysts estimate that in 2015 Airbnb made $6 billion in
gross bookings. 18 It now offers more bookings than major hotel chains, including the Hyatt,
Hilton, and Intercontinental. 19 At the same time, Airbnb defines itself very differently from a
hotel chain, and, as it disrupts the hotel industry, it faces legal attacks on both the legislative and
judicial fronts. In response to these vigorous attempts to limit the operation of the platform,
Airbnb has argued that the existing laws simply do not capture its new business model and do
not fit the new economy. 20 Airbnb describes its business model as a matching platform of private
homes, connecting private individuals to other private individuals, while collecting a 6% to 12%
booking fee. Airbnb owns no property and provides no services beyond the digital world.
Similarly, in the commercial real estate rental market, Loosecubes, Regus, and DeskWanted have
carved out the shared office space market, matching people who have an extra desk, studio, or
15

Joel Stein, Baby, You Can Drive My Car, and Do My Errands, and Rent My Stuff…, TIME (Jan 29, 2015).
Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2013).
AIRNBN, INC., https://www.airbnb.com/.
18
Rafat Ali, Airbnb’s Revenues Will Cross Half Billion Mark in 2015, Analysts Estimate, SKIFT (Mar. 25, 2015),
http://skift.com/2015/03/25/airbnbs-revenues-will-cross-half-billion-mark-in-2015-analysts-estimate/.
19
Julie Weed, Airbnb Grows to a Million Rooms, and Hotel Rivals Are Quiet, For Now, N.Y. TIMES (May 11,
2015).
20
David Streitfeld, Companies Built on Sharing Balk When It Comes to Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014).
16
17
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office space with independent freelancers and entrepreneurs. Following a similar business model
to Airbnb, Loosecubes charges a 10% fee for each transaction and now offers spaces in 535
cities in 66 countries. 21
Valued at over $40 billion, Uber is perhaps the best-known example of a disruptive
digital platform business. Founded in 2009, the company coordinates over one million rides a
day and has now reached a higher valuation than rental car giants Hertz and Avis. 22 Lyft, the
second largest transportation platform company and Uber’s competitor, has raised over $300
million in funding and has tens of thousands of providers in over 65 cities.23 Other platform
competitors have been established around the world, such as BlaBlaCar, a France-based
transportation company, which raised $100 million in 2014 and has recently expanded into India,
its fourteenth market. 24 Other new companies focus on long-distance transportation, such as
Tripda, while others focus on servicing particular markets, such as universities (Zimride) and
children (Shuddle). Each of these companies offers a creative take on traditional markets and
uses a variety of disruptive technologies to shake up their respective industries. These new
transportation businesses match drivers and passengers via smartphone technology and
sophisticated matching algorithms. Unlike taxicabs and limousines, these companies do not
position themselves as common carriers, and most do not seek regulatory licensing traditionally
required for such services. 25 Uber asserts it is not a taxi business but rather merely an app and
network. It argues that it owns no cabs and the cab drivers are not employees but rather
independent contractors.26 In public statements, Uber stresses that it “does not provide
transportation services,” “is not a transportation carrier,” and that the independent contractors
who sign up with it are the true “transportation companies.”27 The taxicab industry and some
regulators are arguing otherwise. Is Uber one big business? Is each driver a small enterprise? Are
Uber drivers workers, independent contractors, or franchisees?
These questions are far from theoretical. They are acute and pervasive. Over 1000 cities
now have such services available, and new models continue to develop rapidly. For example,
other companies—still in the transportation realm—are disrupting the car rental industry.
Car2Go and ZipCar offer short-term use of a smart car in a designated zone; DecoBike offers use
of bikes throughout the city and return at a designated location. Getaround, founded in San
Francisco, allows car owners to rent out their vehicles. Disrupting service and staffing company,
TaskRabbit, similarly founded in San Francisco, allows users to list errands they need to get
21

Jeremy Rifkin, The End of the Capitalist Era, and What Comes Next, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 1, 2014).
Ellen Huet, Uber Says It’s Doing 1 Million Rides Per Day, 140 Million in Last Year, FORBES: TECH (Dec. 17,
2014).
23
Mark Sullivan, Lyft has raised a new $530M round, reaching a valuation of $3B, VENTUREBEAT (Mar. 11,
2015).
24
Lora Kolodny, French Company BlaBlaCar Raises $100M to Make Ride-Sharing Easy, WALL ST. J.: TECH (July
2, 2014).
25
Stephanie Francis Ward, Internet Car Companies Offer Convenience, but Lawyers See Caution Signs, ABA J.,
Jan. 1 2014, at 13–14.
26
Aswath Damodaran, A Disruptive Cab Ride to Riches: The Uber Payoff, FORBES: INVESTING (June 10, 2014).
27
Stephanie Francis Ward, Internet Car Companies Offer Convenience, but Lawyers See Caution Signs, ABA J.,
Jan. 1 2014, at 13–14.
22

done, including handyman jobs and personal assistance. TaskRabbits, the people who have been
certified by the site, bid to work on the tasks, and TaskRabbit, the company, takes an average
15% fee of the offer price. Need a dog walker? DogVacay will link you to one. Need a teacher?
Skillshare will connect you. Need a programmer to update a Wikipedia entry? Fiver will find you
one.
Disrupting the restaurant market, Eatwith aggregates offerings of secret suppers and popup restaurants, which are held in an individual’s home or other private spaces, where food is
prepared in a noncommercial kitchen, without formal permits of city health and code
enforcement officials. 28 Some of these culinary events are set up through less specialized online
sites and instead come together using existing social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter,
and Instagram.
Disrupting network broadcasting and cable providers, Aereo was a start-up founded in
2012, which allowed subscribers to watch and record live TV over the Internet for a monthly
fee. 29 It maintained a bank of miniature, dime-sized antennas in each city it operated in that
pulled down local TV signals broadcast over the air, much like old rabbit ears. Every time a
subscriber wanted to watch or record a show, Aereo assigned them an antenna. Anticipating the
copyright challenges that it would face, Aereo took separate recordings for every single person
watching and provided full control to the user over what content they wanted to save and play. 30
Despite these efforts to use technological innovation to avoid such a ruling, the company went
bankrupt when, in 2014, the United States Supreme Court held that the digital platform was
illegally disrupting the broadcasting industry.
The common pattern that emerges is a definitional one. Platform companies adamantly
endeavor to be defined first and foremost by what they are not. These companies are not selling
the thing itself: the service, the product, the content. Rather, they are selling access to the
software, the matching algorithms, and a digital system of reputation and trust between their
users. 31 In turn, the platform breaks down traditional industry categorizations and, as a result,
presents a challenge in labeling the nature of the business, creating ambiguity as to the definition
of provider-user, employer-employee, and owner-consumer.
Figure I: Start-Ups & Regulated Corollaries
Airbnb
VRBO
HomeAway
Loosecubes
Regus

Hotel

Commercial Rental

28

Sarah Schindler, Regulating the Underground: Secret Supper Clubs, Pop-Up Restaurants, and the Role of Law,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 16, 25 (2015).
29
Jacob Kastrenakes, Aereo loses to broadcasters in Supreme Court fight for its life, THE VERGE (June 25, 2014).
30
Aereo Announces $20.5M Series A Financing Led by IAC; New Technology Platform Allows Consumers Access to
Live TV Over the Internet, Aereo, MARKETWIRED (Feb. 14, 2012).
31
Darcy Allen, What is a taxi? Regulation and the sharing economy, OECD INSIGHTS (Dec. 22, 2014).
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Desk Wanted
Parking Panda
ParqEx
Uber
Lyft
Zipcar
JustShareIt
EatWith
TaskRabbit
AirTasker
Zaarly
DogVaycay
Aereo
FilmOn

Parking Sites
Taxi Industry
Car Rentals
Car Dealers
Restaurants
Manpower Agencies

Pet Services
Broadcasting/Cable

B. The Everything Platform: Challenging Labels as a Form of Innovation
The staggering rise of online networks and digital service companies triggers questions
about the nature of platform businesses and how they generate their value; yet, the platform
economy defies simple definitions. The platform economy is a system characterized primarily by
what it’s not: conventional and static. The most important aspect of the platform economy is that
it includes an ecology of continuously evolving business models. The initial inquiries about their
essence and character point to the challenge itself: we are in unchartered territories, a new zone
of economic relations. Law and language attempt to chart boundaries, and yet they are inherently
limited in covering all forms of life and human imagination. Innovation is always disruptive in
that regard. When it comes to new industries and embryonic business models, lawmakers need to
tread carefully. While this has always been true, the platform is introducing new models and
structures of exchange in unprecedented rates. Platform companies often have very few real
assets, and their value is embedded in their technology, their user base, and their brand.
Moreover, platform companies are able to quickly morph and expand, rendering innovation
through definitional defiance unstoppable. Consider Uber’s ambitions for a moment. Uber
recently changed its motto from Everyone’s Private Driver to Where Lifestyle meets Logistics. 32
The shift from “driving” to “lifestyle” is telling. Uber’s critical mass of users and its continuous
perfection of its software are opening opportunities for its expansion. Why stop at rides when it
can offer delivery services and carpooling? Why stop at cars when the technology it develops
can be extended to other forms of transportation, such as boats, planes, and, eventually,
driverless cars?
This is not a futuristic dream but instead an emerging reality. Uber has launched a courier
delivery service, UberRUSH, as well as UberBOAT, a service to request a water taxi around the
32

Adam Vaccaro, Uber Isn’t a Car Service. It’s the Future of Logistics, INC. (Dec. 13, 2013),
http://www.inc.com/adam-vaccaro/uber-isnt-a-car-service.html.

Harbor, currently operating in Boston but soon expanding to Sydney, Australia and elsewhere (in
addition to Uber’s boating services, other actors in the platform economy are offering flights).
UberPOOL coordinates individual riders who are travelling to similar locations along a similar
route. If there is a match found along the route, the rider will be notified of the co-riders’ first
name. 33 Clearly, Uber aspires to be the Everything Platform, similar to how Amazon morphed
from a bookstore to the Everything Store. In 2015, Uber announced that it is investing in research
and development of self-driving cars. 34 Uber also recently announced that it would develop its
own mapping platform and move away from Google Maps. At the same time, Google is also
realizing the potential of what can, in effect, only be described as the Everything Economy and
has announced its ambition in getting into the ride-sharing service game with self-driving cars as
well. 35 A new venture in Silicon Valley, appropriately called Magic, promises to further push the
totality vision of the platform. Magic’s business model is its promise to deliver “Anything you
want. As long as it’s not illegal”—a tiger to your door, sushi on a boat, or your parking ticket
vanished. 36 The company launched in February 2015 and logged 17,000 requests in its first 48
hours of operation. Magic indeed.
As the platform continues to morph and expand, the disruption of conventional business
models, definitional boundaries, and doctrinal order will swell (see figure 2). A recent PwC
report calls companies to audit all tangible and intangible assets which could potentially be
profitably introduced into the platform including energy, telecoms and retailing. 37 As it continues
to grow, the platform can be best understood as clusters of market developments driven by
network technology that continuously disrupt previous notions of economies of production,
consumption, finance, knowledge, and education. The potential as well as the peril of such an
amorphous beast is at the core of the regulatory pushbacks it is encountering, and even more
fundamentally, the binary accounts of its utopian or dystopian nature.
Figure 2: Fifty Ways to Look at the Platform
Traditional
Categories

Web 3.0 Categories

Meta
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C. The Platform Economy: Romantic Utopia or Nightmare Dystopia?
The realities of the recent cycles of financial crises and economic restructuring together
with advances in digital technology and shifts in lifestyle have created the perfect storm for the
platform economy. The reasons for the rise of the platform economy are key to analyzing the
contemporary challenges presented by existing regulations and the normative questions about
law’s continued role. Contemporary debates, however, have not reflected this complexity. One of
the striking dimensions of public debates about the platform is the strong bipolar descriptions of
its revolutionary potential. These descriptions are largely raised in broad brushes and absolute
terms either hailing the platform as the anti-corporate utopian answer to twentieth century
discontent or an accelerated path to further injustice and inequality. While many celebrate the
platform’s potential to positively transform capitalism to something kinder and fairer, others
view the transformation as dangerous to work relations, consumer welfare, distributive justice,
and regulatory compliance. On one side of the debate, the platform is romantically envisioned as
a return to the days without corporate dominance, when interactions happened directly and
intimately between individuals, when design was bottom-up and relationships were based on
community rather than markets. 38 For opponents of the platform, it is a dystopian uber-capitalist
development in which every interaction becomes the basis of market exchanges, privacy and
leisure are lost, and Silicon Valley style-libertarians become richer at the expense of everyone
else. 39
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Many commentators decry that “regulatory mechanisms have not kept pace” 40 and that
this will hurt consumers because platform businesses avoid established regulations and “typically
operate outside them.” 41 Most of all, some view the rise of the platform not simply as avoiding
regulatory compliance but as directly linked to the desire of businesses to avoid employee
welfare-enhancing laws and economic practices such as long-term employment, liability and
insurance, and product quality control that have been the bedrock of the twentieth century. For
example, progressive economist Dean Baker views the platform as “largely based on evading
regulations and breaking the law,” subjecting consumers to substandard, and often unsafe,
products and services. 42 Speaking directly to the utopian/dystopian duality, Anthony Kalamar
has coined the term “sharewashing,” in which platform companies, under the guise of the
misleading term “sharing economy,” shift liability and risk onto employees and consumers. 43
Others similarly contend, “there is little doubt that the pro-sharing discourse is blind to the dark
side of these innovations.” 44 The contrasting voices, celebrating or denouncing the rise of the
platform, are difficult to reconcile. At the same time, a consensus emerges from the heated
debate: a paradigmatic shift is underway and its costs, benefits, and implications for law are still
unsettled.

II. PRINCIPLES OF THE PLATFORM

A. Transaction Costs Revolution
Can this new set of marketplaces continue to make admirable profits while enabling the
casual owner to monetize possessions or skills that were otherwise collecting dust? –
Forbes 45
In 1937, Ronald Coase wrote about the inherent inefficiencies in the market, sourced in
the high transaction costs throughout the stages of the deal: “operations are often extremely
costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a
world in which the pricing system worked without cost.”46 Transaction costs include search and
information costs for who and what to deal with; negotiation and decision costs, which include
bargaining for the terms of the deal, reaching an agreed upon price, and drafting the contract; and
Valley, SALON (Apr. 12, 2015).
40
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monitoring and compliance costs necessary for successfully carrying out the terms of the deal. 47
In other words, transaction costs can be classified into three categories that correlate with the
three stages of pre-deal, deal-making, and post-deal: 1) search costs; 2) bargaining and decision
costs; and 3) policing and enforcement costs. 48 Each stage depends on information to reduce
costs. The platform, which increases connectivity, access to information, and the application of
advanced technology to every aspect of the deal, impacts the relevant transactions costs at all
three stages. As the platform grows, efficiencies grow as well. In a systemic way, the market,
quite simply, is perfecting.
The platform is driven first and foremost by a combination of technological
advancements. In less than a decade, Internet access has grown by over 500%. Most American
consumers have at least one mobile device with high-speed networks, GPS, and smart apps.
Most of the western world now has Internet access and the developing world is rapidly gaining
access as well. The Internet is predicted to connect 50 billion mobile wireless devices by 2020.49
With more users, better algorithms for matching, better software for pricing, better division of
resources to tailor each deal, and better data mining to monitor the exchange transaction costs are
reduced dramatically.
This section presents ten fundamental principles of the platform economy. They include
the shift from ownership to access (proprietas to usus), the monetization of excess, the reduction
of overhead, and the extension of the life cycle of products. They also include dynamic use of
pricing algorithms and rating data. As will be described in Part IIB, beyond the efficiency
enhancing principles of the platform, the rise of the platform economy is also driven by shifting
preferences including an increased desire for choice and variety, for authenticity of experience,
for reducing one’s carbon footprint, and for a general anti-corporate sentiment. Whether the
platform actually offers what it sells is, at least in part, separate and distinct from the question of
what it is selling: a lifestyle filled with unique authentic experiences, responsible green
consumption, social connectivity, and consumer empowerment.

1. Economies of Scale
In the industrial era, the corporate structure allowed markets to scale. The scale of
informal exchanges was small and left unregulated. As platform companies enter to compete
with established industries, they are increasingly taking a lion’s share of their anti-industry.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, the rise in wireless technology and the expansion of online
connectivity has allowed a return in some ways to the pre-industrial village – bartering, sharing,
and other direct individual-to-individual monetized exchanges. Despite this retro feel, however,
47
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the platform village is nothing like the physical village. Rather, platform companies connect
strangers on a global high-intensity scale. The potential to digitally connect users all around the
world is unprecedented.
2. No More Waste
A key principle of the platform is putting idle capacity to work. The platform enables the
use of private resources more efficiently. Most assets are shelved the majority of the time they
are owned. The car is used only about 10% of the day. The lawnmower is used once every two
weeks. The spare bedroom is occupied only twice a year when the in-laws visit. Still on the
supply side, with labor market downturns and high unemployment rates, many are seeking to fill
up their free time and to flexibly earn extra income. In other words, the platform resurrects
dormant capital—be it tangible products or human capital.50 This includes dormant labor
capacity in the form of downtime and in the form of skills that people own but have not
previously been able to monetize. Many people are good cooks, handymen, home-designers,
computer wizzes, artists, or writers but do not use those skills professionally. The platform
economy gives people who have developed a skill unrelated to their main source of income the
ability to commercialize that skill. In other words, supply is increased by adding under-utilized
assets into the market and, in turn, costs are reduced.

3. Tailoring the Transactional Unit
Related to the end of idle capacity is the ability of the platform to slice up time and space
into smaller units. The platform breaks down both supply and demand into tiny modalities: short
term rentals, a few minutes of personal assistance, a couple of hours of furniture installation, or
an evening a week of an amateur chef’s dinner at her private home. There is efficiency in renting
a car for an hour rather than for a day; efficiency in crashing on the couch in someone’s house
rather than getting your own hotel room; and efficiency in renting a house together with two
other families rather than getting three suites at an established resort. Digital technology
facilitates these smaller exchanges, a feature Yochai Benkler has termed granularity, 51 which
would otherwise be impossible without instantaneous communication among millions of
individuals. The platform allows services and products to be rented out by the minute resulting in
a transactional unit that is extremely small.
4. We Are All Capitalists Now
The share of sharing is growing exponentially but sharing is not free. True, the platform
offers bartering (Babysitting Co-Ops), gifting (Freecycle and Kashless), and swapping (thredUP
and SwapTree) options, but even those exchanges formalize and systemically record previously
informal exchanges. The lion share of exchanges on the platform, however, is based on the price
50
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of renting, trading, servicing, and lending for a fee. In fact, in many ways, the platform tilts the
balance away from altruistic/communal interactions to market/commodified exchanges. Imagine
the monetization of everything. From a Coasean transaction cost perspective, quite intuitively,
uber-capitalization is another way in which supply increases, resulting in reduced costs for
consumers. At the same time, there are, of course, costs to monetizing everything: your leisure
time, your friendships, and your private home. The platform takes seriously the saying that
everything, and everyone, has a price.
5. From Prêt-à-Porter to the People’s Haute Couture
In the wake of several economic downturns, consumers are demanding more competitive
prices and smaller packaging of their services. They are also demanding more input into the
metrics of what they consume. The platform promises to end misfit between non-tailored supply
and specific demands. As offerings become extremely disaggregated, consumers can find exactly
what they were looking for: renting a non-smoking, pet-friendly, Kosher, and partly furnished
apartment for three nights in a specific neighborhood, with specified features, and at a specific
cost. In other words, the platform facilitates better customization of the terms and conditions of
the transaction to fit individual needs with a new degree of specificity.
6. Access over Ownership
Zero waste and the resurrection of dead capital can be achieved because of a shift from a
consumption culture that is dominated by acquisition to a mindset of access. Instead of owning a
car, what becomes important is the ability to use one when needed. Instead of purchasing the
lawnmower, knowing that it is there to serve you when the grass has grown is sufficient. In
particular, as population density and urbanization continue to rise, congestion and smaller spaces
push consumers to prefer access above ownership. This shift from ownership to access further
reduces transaction costs by reducing the stakes of the deal. Purchasing an annual membership in
a car sharing platform is not as weighty a deal as buying a car, and purchasing use of a car for an
hour is not as costly as renting a car for a day.
7. Less Overhead
With the advent of the platform, transactions are also decentralized in the sense that there
is far less intermediation. No more middleman, besides – of course – the platform. Direct
exchanges between private individuals are not new, but they are happening on an unprecedented
scale. Technology allows private parties to coordinate directly without the need for much more
than the software. As described in Part I, while the business models of platform companies vary
significantly, many platform companies charge around 15% for each transaction they facilitate.
This overhead is far smaller than when offline companies offer similar services in their
respective industries. Online companies have far fewer expenses than their offline counterparts:
they do not own the assets they broker or employ the people who exchange their labor.
Nevertheless, as we shall see, the question of costs is inextricably tied with the question of
regulating the platform. Costs inevitably increase if, for example, Uber is legally deemed to be
an employer of all the drivers it connects to passengers.

8. Reduced Barriers to Entry
The platform economy encourages new entrants into industries that have been long
entrenched with incumbents. Related to the reduction in overhead, startup costs to digitally
compete are low. All you need is a domain name and website. By providing marketplaces of
programmers, the platform has also lowered these minimal setup costs. At the same time, the
platform reliance on scale and trust creates a first mover and mass-scale advantages to some,
which suggests that we might witness recentralization even as the platform allows
decentralization. 52 Even more importantly, there are virtually zero startup costs to become a
user/provider, essentially a micro-entrepreneur, on one of the existing platforms. Thus, the
platform is fundamentally changing the way we exchange and interact as market actors. If you
want to test out your abilities as a chef or a bed and breakfast host, you simply list your offering
on an existing platform and wait for an offer.
9. Pricing Precision
When it was first founded, Airbnb realized that choosing a price was the most difficult
stage in the listing process for private hosts. Now Airbnb uses a sophisticated series of
algorithms to suggest pricing. It developed a model for providing dynamically tailored price
recommendations based on location, likeness to other properties, and time of the year. 53 The
model takes into account measures like the temperature at any given time as a proxy for
seasonality. Similarly, Uber prices rides dynamically, offering discounts when demand is lower
while raising prices in peak hours.54 Uber’s “dynamic” or “surge” pricing model adjusts to
increase driver efficiency, which gives more incentives for supply when demand is high.55 These
sophisticated pricing algorithms, which continue to evolve through systemic learning, allow for a
more accurate valuation of goods and services and reduce both negotiation and uncertainty costs
in striking the deal.
10. Dynamic Information
Transaction costs are high in the face of information asymmetries. Consumers do not
know the quality of the experience they are paying for until they actually consume it; individuals
are not familiar with the service they pay for until after they complete the transaction. To combat
this, the platform offers dynamic ratings, reviews, and information, which reduce uncertainty and
deepen consumer confidence. It also reduces monitoring costs because the certainty that one will
52
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receive a bad review creates ex-ante incentives to comply with the terms of the deal. As will be
discussed in more length in Part IV, the same technological factors that dramatically reduce
transaction costs of search and negotiation also enable dynamic quality monitoring, transparency,
record-keeping, and data-mining that reduce information asymmetry between providers and
consumers, building confidence in the deal. This confidence increases over time as interlocking
networks in the platform mature.

B. Market Challenging or Market Creating?
In large part, the battle over definitions, boundaries, and regulation depends on
understanding the economic logic of the platform. Are new platform companies successfully
competing with established regulated industries because they are introducing new business
models and creating a substantively different economic transaction, or because they seek
regulatory avoidance and generate value from such avoidance? Even if they do not actively seek
regulatory avoidance, the question of whether to extend existing regulations to the platform will
depend on whether these new companies are at their core essentially similar to the industries they
disrupt. In other words, even when we recognize the economic logic of reducing transaction
costs as the core essence of the rise of the platform, we still need to answer whether a platform
company is either competing within an existing industry or carving out a new market. To this
end, it is important to recognize the difference between market competition and market
differentiation. Adding to the complexity of the regulation-innovation nexus at the heart of the
platform economy is the fact that the platform is doing both: perfecting and changing existing
markets as well as creating new ones.
In economics, differentiation, or dynamic competition, refers to ways in which businesses
compete not simply over pricing but over the kind of services and products offered. 56 The
platform offers new experiences and shapes new preferences. Take, for example, Uber and Lyft.
At Uber, drivers add amenities to their cars, such as a bottle of water, tissue paper, or hard candy.
The transactions are cashless and tip-less, which is not only meant to ensure convenience but
also a sense of safety – and perhaps a sense of trust and social connection by partially obscuring
the monetary aspect of the exchange. In lifestyle consumption, such small differences matter and
can modify the experience. At Lyft, passengers ride shotgun with the drivers. The message
communicated is one of parity and community inclusion. Ride hailing platform companies also
compete with ride sharing apps in which people join drivers who are going somewhere anyway,
which is further along on the differentiation spectrum. This latter experience is one more akin to
carpooling, even if it is mediated through the platform and carries a price tag. The use of these
platform facilitates transactions is not only about cost savings but also carries the meaning of an
environmentally responsible practice of reducing the number of cars on the road.
Lifestyle and social meaning is important to the platform. At the broadest level, the
matching system provides a sense of community, which maps onto a contemporary anti56
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corporatist sentiment. People value the idea of paying the provider directly, even if the platform
takes a cut:
No matter how well trained service employees might be, everyone is nicer when they’re
dealing with customers directly. Even customers. Nearly everyone who stays at an
Airbnb rental, for instance, hangs up their bathroom towels after they use them.57
The distinct experience of exchange through the platform is significant if it changes the
nature of the transaction rather than simply adding a competitor to the existing market. The
societal factors for the rise of the platform economy are multiple. Consumers describe a
preference for a different kind of market exchange. For example, the rise of lodging platforms
such as VRBO, Homeaway, and Airbnb can be linked to a sense of adventure in renting a home
directly from its owner rather than staying at a generic hotel chain. Foodies enjoy the idea of
eating at the private home of an aspiring chef and being the first to discover the “new, new
thing.” The fact that consumers are choosing with their feet and reporting a preference for the
choices presented by platform companies is evident by the sheer numbers. 58
However, the choices and preferences are themselves formed by the deepening of the
platform into our everyday life. Consider Airbnb. Studies find that consumers that use Airbnb
stay longer on vacations than they would if they stayed at a hotel, and some guests would not
have gone on a vacation at all but for access to the lodging platform. Airbnb commissioned a
study that found that Airbnb rentals are cheaper than hotels, leading people vacationing in
California to stay longer and spend on average 31% more than hotel guests. The study also found
that 14% of customers would not have visited San Francisco at all if an Airbnb stay was not
available. 59 In other words, the platform incited their consumption rather than merely providing
an alternative brand within an existing consumer market. Similarly, the platform may legitimize,
not simply make affordable, the hiring of a personal assistant, dog walker, driver, tutor, or
personal chef, something that would otherwise seem awkward and unseemly to many people in
an offline world. Web 3.0 is transforming the lifestyle of the masses rather than simply
facilitating better matches for a static equilibrium of supply and demand. The platform is
generating a different set of preferences and thereby reconfiguring markets.
The behavioral aspects and preference formation in the platform can help explain the
variance in the level of pushback from established industries in reaction to different platform
disruptions. Juxtaposing the taxi industry in the case of ride-sharing and the hotel industry in the
case of home-sharing, the hotel industry has been much less averse to Airbnb compared to the
taxi industry reaction to Uber/Lyft. 60 At least in part, the difference can be explained by the
elasticity in each of the markets and whether the platform presents direct competition. In general,
Airbnb competes more directly with bargain and boutique independent hotels, while luxury
hotels and bigger hotel chains, which cater to business clients, are less affected. A recent study
examining the impact of Airbnb on the hotel industry finds only a small, statistically
57
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insignificant negative effect of Airbnb on upscale hotels. 61 The study concludes that “Airbnb’s
impact is non-uniformly distributed, with lower-priced hotels, and hotels not catering to business
travel being the most affected segments” and that “affected hotels have responded by reducing
prices, an impact that beneﬁts all consumers, not just participants in the sharing economy.” 62
At the same time, as we saw above, Airbnb is also changing consumption patterns more
fundamentally, aiding consumers to imagine their dream vacations, to plan trips that would not
otherwise be planned, and to stay longer at new cities. Indeed, the paradigmatic shift enabled by
the platform, from ownership to access, maps onto contemporary social psychology research
showing that expenditures on experiences result in greater happiness than purchases of tangible
goods. 63 These changing patterns of experience consumption are endogenous to the rise of the
platform economy and can help explain how business models such as Airbnb and Uber disrupt
more than one industry. They reconfigure a range of industries by altering basic patterns of
supply and demand and shifting incentives previously associated with traditional purchasing
decisions. Rather than simply competing with the hotel industry, Airbnb intervenes in the hotel
and real estate industries, rentals, and titles in ways that shift the balance between these related
industries. The same holds true with Uber. It is creating disruption across the taxi, car rental, and
car sellers markets.
Experiences in the platform are tailored and frequently represent an emphasis on lifestyle.
The platform, especially as it is still forming, often has the appeal of offering exclusive, hip,
edgy, exciting, and unusual experiences, while – ironically – also providing a sense of
community, openness, and bottom-up expansion. 64 The anti-corporate, anti-ownership streak
provides ephemeral value to consumers, further helping explain the rapid rise of the platform.
Platform companies are viewed as having a positive effect on anti-competitive forces: a rejection
of corporate concentration, an anti-establishment, underground, or fringe experience. No doubt,
as the platform grows, much of it will become mainstream and concentration will happen in the
digital world as well. Moreover, again paradoxically, the anti-corporate streak also has in some
platform exchanges an elitist undertone. A secret (and pricey) non-restaurant culinary dining
event set up through the platform can be characterized as skyboxification—grunge for the rich. 65
Still, platform companies position themselves as experiential, de-centralized, pro-amateur, and
crowd-based. There is an overarching ethos of newness, innovation, and empowerment.
This play between exclusive and for-the-masses, amateur and professional, retro and new
are all at the core of what the platform is selling. Whether or not any one descriptive feature
reflects the realities of platform companies is not insignificant, but it is not the entirety of the
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inquiry. The consumption experience itself matters. Moreover, the realities of the platform
economy will continue to be shaped, in part, by how closely it will be regulated in relation to
regulated industry competitors. In other words, the framework itself is unstable and normatively
dependent on the answers we provide as legal theorists and policymakers.

III. CONTESTED GROUNDS OF THE PLATFORM: OWN NO EVIL, EMPLOY NO EVIL, DIRECT NO EVIL

A. Law as Enabler and Inhibitor
Much of [Uber’s] spectacular growth has been fueled by outdated regulation. – Harvard
Business Review 66
There were laws created for businesses, and there were laws for people. What the sharing
economy did was create a third category: people as businesses. – Brian Chesky, co-founder,
Airbnb 67
Some are sad, and some are glad, and some are very, very bad. – Dr. Seuss 68

It is an age-old debate. Does law aid or hinder innovation? New technologies present new
opportunities and new challenges for regulation. The rise of the platform adds new types of risk,
implicating liability laws, consumer protection laws, insurance laws, employment and labor
laws, and property and zoning laws. But they also provide new ways to address some of the very
same social goals that law has attempted to direct. We are accustomed to thinking in terms of a
new industry followed by a new set of regulations, but market innovation also offers an
opportunity for more foundational thinking about the role of regulation. New economic forms
push for new legal processes. The platform economy has introduced innovation in services, in
entrepreneurship, and in the way we work. When manufacturing rose in the industrial era, New
Dealers introduced new regulations, such as safety standards for the auto industry. During the era
of the Great Society, trans-industry agencies including OSHA and the EPA were formed, and
new regulations were introduced, often building on and adopting industry self-standards. 69 In
cycles of financial crisis and cycles of technological leaps, markets readjust, new types of
transactions are introduced, and in turn new forms of regulation are adopted. Even beyond
external economic and social forces, considering the law as a more closed system, scholars have
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observed repeated internal cyclical conversions between over- and under-regulation, especially
when disruptive business models are introduced.70
The goals of regulation are multiple. Regulation can involve correction of market failures
and incentivization of competition. Regulation can be designed to address public safety, quality
control, privacy, access, equality, fairness, and distributional concerns. All regulations are
presumed to enhance the public welfare, but a realistic understanding of regulation in action is
that not all regulation is equally situated in this regard. Public choice theory and capture help
explain regulatory barriers to entry that do not contribute to overall welfare. 71 Other regulations
are simply outdated based on wrong economic and scientific presumptions, or their goals can be
achieved otherwise more efficiently and more accurately.
The regulatory questions raised by the rapid rise of the platform are expansive. They span the
entire map of the legal world, including work, tax, safety and health, quality and consumer
protection, intellectual property, zoning, and anti-discrimination. The following section identifies
clusters of regulatory logic. The platform economy pushes us to look at the world of regulation
with fresh eyes and to analyze regulatory requirements with these categories in mind. Laws that
do not promote welfare but protect entrenched interests are easy cases. On this end of the
spectrum, the Article identifies many permitting and licensing laws as well as price controls. Tax
laws are a similarly easy case because these laws continue with the same logic as in the preplatform offline market. The hardest cases are regulations that are about fairness, externalities,
and normative preferences in a democratic process. These include consumer protection laws,
quality and safety controls, zoning laws, employment laws, and intellectual property laws.

B. Easy Cases: Competition and Barriers to Entry
The traditional way is you can’t do it unless you get a license. That made sense up until we
had data. Now the starting point is yes. —Nick Grossman, Union Square Ventures 72

1. Permitting
There are regulations that enhance public welfare and there are those that enhance the
interests of lobbyists, rent-seekers, and entrenched interests. 73 In the transportation market, the
taxi industry has claimed that Uber and Lyft and other transportation platform companies
circumvent the regulations and licensing fees that taxicab companies have to contend with. In
70
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February 2015, the Broward County Commission in Florida voted to regulate ride-sharing
services the same way taxis are regulated. 74 As a result, Uber and Lyft will be required to obtain
the same certificates as taxis and limousines. In 2014, the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission held separate hearings for Lyft and Uber to decide whether the companies should be
granted permanent licenses to operate statewide. Similar hearings are underway around the
country and across the world. In other states, like Texas and Colorado, Uber and other ridesharing services have been essentially shut out by rules governing limo services that restrict
charging riders based on time elapsed or distance traveled. 75
At the federal level, a Senate Bill 1457 was introduced to create a new category of a
transportation company, offering legal status for ride-sharing companies.76 Such an effort rejects
the application of the stringent permitting requirements imposed on traditional transportation
industries and looks at the platform as a new emerging market. Similarly, in California, the
Public Utilities Commission reached an interim agreement to allow ride-sharing companies to
operate while it weighs proposals that would make them full-fledged, legally operating
“transportation network companies.”77 This new category would not be regulated identically to
taxis but rather would likely involve state licensing, required criminal background checks on
drivers, and mandatory insurance coverage even more stringent than that required of limo
companies. In general, Uber is encouraged in some jurisdictions, including California, Oregon,
and Washington, but was initially banned in Nevada, Boise, Brussels, and Berlin, followed by a
nationwide ban in Germany. 78
Attempts at extending permit requirements—what industry interests often call “leveling
the playing field” between ride-sharing companies and taxi companies, or between other
platform companies and the businesses they disrupt—are generally harmful to the evolution of
the platform and to competitive markets more broadly. Under capture theory, industry players
extract rent from special permitting, licensing, and other regulatory requirements. 79 By designing
around these regulatory rents, platform businesses create value for consumers as well as push
incumbents to become more efficient and responsive in ways that they would otherwise not be.
The requirement of obtaining taxicab medallions is a paradigmatic example of rents. Here is a
striking statistic: in the mid-2000s, there were only 12,799 licensed taxicabs in New York City
compared with 21,000 in 1931 when the city had a million fewer inhabitants.80 Limited grants of
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permits, especially coupled with regulations such as all transportation cars having to be of the
same color (yellow cabs), dramatically reduce incentives and access to compete. While
consumers largely benefit from requiring platform transportation companies to have similar
safety and insurance standards as taxis, the same is not true about restrictions on prices, routes,
and entry. 81 Instead of permitting, regulators should consider direct regulation of the benefits.
This is the model that California regulators seem to be following. If risk reduction is the
underlying reason for permitting requirements, technology companies could be deemed liable for
accidents and therefore could be required to provide insurance. As we shall see, there are many
other paths to directly elevate safety without imposing permit requirements.
2. Occupational Licensing
A few decades ago, only 5% of jobs required a license. Now nearly one-third of all jobs
require some sort of licensing. Some professional services have been historically subject to
licensing, such as the law bar and medical boards. 82 More recently, occupational licensing has
been extended to such low-skill jobs as hairdressers, manicurists, and restaurant workers. As one
group of economist have recently stated:
Occupational licensing has been abused by incumbent market participants to exclude
rivals, often in unreasonable ways, and to raise prices. This disturbing trend already costs
consumers billions of dollars every year and impedes job growth. 83
In July 2015, the White House issued a report prepared by the Department of the Treasury Office
of Economic Policy, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Department of Labor regarding
occupational licensing. 84 The report similarly notes “more than one-quarter of U.S. workers now
require a license to do their jobs, with most of these workers licensed by the States.” 85 The report
warns that while some licensing is designed to provide safety and professionalism:
The current licensing regime in the United States also creates substantial costs, and often
the requirements for obtaining a license are not in sync with the skills needed for the job.
There is evidence that licensing requirements raise the price of goods and services,
restrict employment opportunities, and make it more difficult for workers to take their
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skills across State lines. Too often, policymakers do not carefully weigh these costs and
benefits when making decisions about whether or how to regulate a profession through
licensing. 86
The effects of the accelerated rise in occupational licensing to jobs traditionally open to all
workers are anti-competitive and regressive, which negatively impacts new entry. 87 Permitting
and licensing requirements, price controls, and threshold entry standards are all ex-ante
barriers. 88 Like with permitting, ex-post regulations that directly address safety and liability are
generally preferable and more conducive to new entry. Ex-post regulations include insurance
systems and tort and product liability laws.
3. Rate Fixing
In February 2015, the City of Orlando passed an ordinance that requires ride-sharing
companies to charge the same rate as taxis, $2.40 a mile. 89 In general, taxicabs are regulated not
only through medallion licensing requirements, which are expensive and hard to get, but also by
the rates taxis may charge passengers. 90
A great innovation of the platform, achieved primarily by technological advances, is
accuracy in linking pricing to supply and demand. As a recent article in the MIT Technology
Review argues, “dynamic pricing is the future, even if the road to get there will be bumpy.” 91
Uber’s dynamic pricing, though received with hostility by the media, is designed for more than
maximizing profits in the face of increased demand, which most companies, take for example the
airline industry, do in the face of fixed supply. 92 Rather, because of the nature of the platform,
Uber’s surge pricing also operates to increase supply: more drivers turn on their Uber app when
they see that the rates have increased. Uber reports that supply of drivers increases by 70-80%
when surge pricing is introduced, and more importantly, it eliminates two-thirds of unfulfilled
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requests, which demonstrates the magic of the platform economy: supply, as well as demand, is
highly elastic. 93 This is a fundamentally responsive market-perfecting model:
Dynamic pricing changes are driven algorithmically when wait times are increasing
dramatically, and “unfulfilled requests” start to rise. In essence, there are two functions of
the increased price model. One is to increase supply. The second function of the price
increase is to temporarily intentionally reduce demand. Through these two mechanisms,
the company is able to (a) increase supply, (b) assure reliability, a key tenet of the
company, and (c) maximize the number of completed rides. 94
While economically sound, the technological innovation of dynamic pricing is
nonetheless in many ways in tension with regulatory schemes. Many states have anti-gouging
laws that prevent situations when sellers of goods or services raise prices during times of
increased demand, such as after a natural disaster. California limits price increases by retailers
after an emergency to 10%. The goal of anti-gouging laws in this case is to create fairness during
times of extreme strife. But when the goal is simply to subvert the market effects of short-term
volatility in supply and demand, anti-gouging laws are distortive and counter-productive.

4. Tax Collection
A primary concern of local regulators involves whether the platform economy should be
taxed at the same levels as competing industries. A central issue for Airbnb has been the question
of hotel tax. Airbnb recently paid $25 million in hotel taxes to the city of San Francisco as
backpay to account for the past several years. 95 Other cities have started to demand rent-sharing
hosts pay taxes. For example, New York and Portland require people who rent their homes to
add local hotel taxes to visitors’ bills.96 San Diego requires anyone who owns, operates, or
manages rental properties to charge rental unit business taxes. This includes hotels, motels, and
any property that is advertised or rented during the calendar year. 97
Airbnb claims that it benefits cities in multiple ways. First, Airbnb claims it can collect
millions in hotel occupancy taxes this year, and the number would continue to increase each
year. Moreover, Airbnb claims that the platform generates many times more millions of dollars
in economic activity in cities in which it has listings. When renters stay at an Airbnb location,
they are often staying in local neighborhoods, eating at local restaurants, and shopping at local
vendors.98
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Tax law is an easy case because it is designed to collect a percentage of profit from
economic activities wherever the transactions were generated. The questions of collection are
largely technical and require adaptation to new forms of dealing. 99 For pragmatic purposes, it
may make sense to put the responsibility for tax collection on the platform provider rather than
on individual users. The choice to do so is based on the convenience and efficiency of collection.
Effectively, under current definitions, for the enterprise to avoid falling under the pertinent state
regulatory scheme, the provider must be considered a pure broker of information rather than one
of goods or services. 100 This avoids defining the enterprise in a manner that makes state
regulation applicable (i.e., Airbnb doesn’t provide hotel rooms, rather, it provides information to
prospective guests and advertisements for hosts). In requiring the provider to collect and pay
taxes derived directly from the end consumer, the state could be seen as implying that the
platform provider is in fact the service provider, with the agent at the point of sale an employee.
However, regardless of potential implications to the harder questions of liability, consumer
protection laws, and employment protection laws, tax collection by the platform company may
well be the most adequate and practical solution. As such, platform companies can become
regulatory facilitators using their technological capacities to collect as well as provide audited
evidence of compliance in the era of decentralized peer-to-peer transactions. Importantly, the
question of tax collection should thus be delinked from the definitional questions embedded in
other bodies of law that will be discussed below. Indeed, one insight emerging from a fresh look
at the innovation-regulation framework mandated by the platform economy is that rather than
lumping all regulatory questions together and attempting to answer them as one, different
regulatory bodies should be examined separately and with purpose.

C. Hard Cases: Public Welfare in the Platform

1. The Experience Economy: Does Airbnb Violate Zoning Laws?
City officials fear lodging platform companies like Airbnb will negatively affect
residential life. 101 While some cities are attempting to limit the lodging platform, others cities are
changing their zoning laws to create more certainty and enable the rise of new lodge-sharing
models. Zoning laws have multiple purposes. They attempt to keep residential areas quiet, clean,
and safe, all of which can be at risk when increasing the number of transient users in these areas.
They also may be designed to increase a sense of neighborhood community and local familiarity.
Zoning laws can also have population planning goals such as rent stabilization and an increase in
the availability of affordable housing for students.
99
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On February 1st, 2015, a new city ordinance took effect in San Francisco that regulates
vacation rentals in private homes. The law legalizes vacation rentals in private homes and
restricts them to permanent residents who must register in person with the city’s planning
department. Additionally, vacation rentals are limited to 90 days a year for entire-home rentals.
Previously, residential rentals of less than 30 days were illegal, though the rule was only loosely
enforced. The law is not only designed to allow short-term private rentals but also to dissuade
non-locals from buying San Francisco properties strictly for the business of short-term rentals. A
housing shortage in San Francisco influenced the reason behind the latter restriction, such that
the law will keep San Francisco homes available for permanent residents. 102 Although the law
has barely taken effect, many are already seeking tighter regulation of the lodging platform, such
as an amendment that would allow affordable housing nonprofits to directly sue private hosts
who break the law. 103
Others are advocating new legislation that would create new insurance requirements for
tenants who proceed with converting their residence into a vacation rental. 104 The insurance
would be similar to what is offered to lodging and bed and breakfast companies that remove a
landlord’s liability for personal injury and property damage done by a sub-letter. Other local
lawmakers, in cities such as San Diego, are pushing for legislation that would maintain zoning
laws and the pre-platform “stable and familiar feel of many residential neighborhoods.” 105
Airbnb has been deemed in some legal disputes around the country to violate local hospitality
regulations, condominium board rules, and other limitations on short-term housing usage. 106
Criticism of Airbnb comes from many directions: angry hosts who found themselves the subjects
of fines and eviction notices as well as city officials who have received complaints from
neighborhoods where disrespectful renters have wreaked havoc. The safety, property value, and
quality of life sentiments reverberate across local debates.
Compared to San Francisco, New York has been more resistant to the expansion of the
lodging platform. New York law prohibits private owners from renting out their apartments for
short periods unless they are living in the property. 107 In fact, New York City residential zoning
and rent control laws render nearly half of Airbnb rentals unlawful.108 In 2015, a New York
judge upheld a landlord’s decision to evict a tenant who was caught leasing out his apartment for
more than twice what he was paying his landlord.109 In particular, New York officials have been
102

Verne Kopytoff, Airbnb’s Woes Show How Far the Sharing Economy Has Come, TIME (Oct. 7, 2013).
Allen Young, State Legislation Could Hit Airbnb, Other Rental Sharing Services With New Rules, SACRAMENTO
BUS. J. (Feb. 24, 2015).
104
Emily Pedersen, City Rent Board to Investigate Legality, Effects of Airbnb on City Housing, THE DAILY
CALIFORNIAN (Feb. 23, 2015).
105
Bort, supra note 101.
106
Ron Klain, Airbnb’s Biggest Disruption: America’s Laws, FORTUNE (Sept. 10, 2014).
107
Ryan Lawler, As It Seeks New Regulations in NY, Airbnb Estimates It Would Collect $65 Million in Taxes There,
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 16, 2015).
108
Jason Clampet, Airbnb’s Growing Pains Mirrored in New York City, Where Half Its Listing Are Illegal Rentals,
SKIFT (Jan. 7, 2013, 11:11 AM), http://skift.com/2013/01/07/airbnbs-growing-pains-mirrored-in-new-york-citywhere-half-its-listings-are-illegal-rentals/.
109
Julia Marsh, Rent-Stabilized Tenant Evicted After Crashing In On Airbnb, N.Y. POST (Feb. 20, 2015).
103

searching for illegal hotels in people who rent multiple units on the Airbnb site. New York
Attorney General Eric Schneiderman has subpoenaed Airbnb for information regarding 225,000
landlords, alleging that 75% of rentals on Airbnb were illegal under the current New York
law. 110 Schneiderman has also attempted to get the company to shut down illegal hotels that have
been developed by hosts using this company. In an attempt to cooperate with officials to identify
hosts who operate de-facto hotels rather than temporarily renting out their homes, Airbnb
reported 124 hosts to the state attorney’s office that Airbnb found to have multiple listings on the
site. 111 David Hantman, the global head of public policy for Airbnb, provided New York with
suggested regulations that would stop these de facto illegal commercial hotels. 112 Hantman
suggests that first, the city should create tougher penalties for unlicensed hotel operators and
amendments that protect regular New Yorkers who want to share their homes. Second, the law
should be amended to allow owners to share space only in the home in which they live. Third,
Airbnb has offered to pay for hosts’ hotel and tourist taxes providing New York with $65 million
that can be used to fund public services in the city, including increasing enforcement activity
against illegal hotels. A final suggestion has been that regulations should prohibit residents from
making more money through home sharing than they pay in rent each month.
Rejecting the New York approach and embracing similar reforms as in California, the
United Kingdom announced that it would be removing laws controlling short-term rentals. 113
France too has legalized short-term rentals of primary residences. 114 Other international cities are
accepting Airbnb but imposing various regulatory controls, such as Amsterdam and Berlin.
Amsterdam allows residents to rent out their homes for up to two months of the year to up to
four people at a time. 115 Other global cities are reacting similarly to New York, such as Berlin
and Barcelona, which have imposed increased restrictions on the operation of Airbnb. 116
The wisdom that emerges from these recent developments and heated debates about the
legality of the vast lodging platform is that often regulatory controls are a matter of legitimate
social tradeoffs and an emphasis on certain values. The residential nature of a city, the spread of
affordable housing, the perceived and actual safety inherent in transient lodging are all questions
that must be answered through the democratic process. These are hard questions because there is
no one right answer. Most of the time, each choice involves preferring one social value over
another. At the same time, the debates need to be based on facts rather than perceptions. Are
jurisdictions that support the spread of the lodging platform more prone to safety issues? If so,
can insurance rather than zoning controls address these concerns? Using a classic economics
terminology, does Airbnb create more negative than positive externalities? Does the potential
noise to resident neighbors by temporary lodgers outweigh the benefits of increased commercial
110
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activity in the neighborhood and affordable tourism overall? From an equity perspective, are
jurisdictions that allow short-term rentals pricing the poor out of their neighborhoods? If so, can
direct affordable housing solutions such as tax subsidies or new development projects better
address these concerns?
These are questions that can only be answered over time, with data and analysis, and the
balance will likely be struck differently in different communities. 117 As the platform economy
rapidly grows, many companies are running up against regulatory hurdles. As thousands of
companies are transforming many aspects of our lives as consumers, workers, and citizens, the
lines we drew through regulation are now being redrawn. The fluidity between home/hotel,
ownership/loan, work/gig, and individual/business presents a challenge to policymakers. The
hard questions that have always been at the core of regulation continue over to new business
models. The problem is that many of the values we desire to promote as lawmakers—freedom,
equality, choice, fairness and welfare—are not only in tension but also incommensurable. 118 As
with permitting and licensing. However, ideally, law makers should attempt to resolve these
competing values with more fine-tuned solutions, such as targeted risk regulation, rather than
direct blanket prohibitions.

2. The Gig Economy: Does Uber Violate Employment Laws?

“Can you imagine if this turns into a Mechanical Turk economy, where everyone is doing
piecework at all odd hours, and no one knows when the next job will come, and how
much it will pay? What kind of private lives can we possibly have, what kind of
relationships, what kind of families?” – Robert Reich 119
From the perspective of labor market shifts, commentators worry that absent regulatory
controls, the platform will lead work to be so app-driven that the internal logic of full-time
employment, job security, and worker rights will collapse. The more labor there is in supply, the
cheaper the pay, or put differently, “the more humans are fungible; that is one human can replace
another and do whatever that person is doing, the less they have value.” 120 A leading critic of
117
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what is termed “the gig economy,” economist Robert Reich argues that the rise of platform
companies is making work life unpredictable, insecure, and, ironically, not even profitable. 121
Based on interviews of platform workers, Reich has concluded that most would rather have
regular well-paying jobs.122
The concerns about the nature of employment in the twenty-first century, while valid and
significant, are largely misdirected. The rise of the contingent workforce precedes the rise of the
platform. The contingent workforce now constitutes more than one-third of all employees with
predictions that it will rise to nearly half of the workforce by 2020. Given these realities, the
question of whether one would rather have a high-paying stable job offline or a part-time job is
misleading. The contrast should be to other available work options, whether enabled by the
platform or not. With that comparison in mind, a new study by Princeton economist Alan B.
Krueger mines through Uber data in order to analyze the work-life realities of Uber drivers. 123
The Krueger report finds that on average, Uber drivers work fewer hours and earn more per hour
than traditional taxi drivers, even after accounting for their expenses. 124 Moreover, most Uber
drivers are employed full- or part-time elsewhere and work for Uber for additional income.
At the same time, similar to many jobs, platform work raises questions about the nature
of the relationship between the providers—drivers, cleaners, hosts, chefs, dog-walkers, personal
assistants—and the platform company. With definitional determinations comes legal
responsibility. Many platform companies – from the grocery delivery service Instacart to the
courier service Postmates – involve people working in time frames and ways that posit a
challenge to traditional modes of employment. The employment status of the providers on these
companies remains uncertain. For example, Handy is a cleaning service, but unlike local
cleaning franchises before it, it digitally and directly connects customer with cleaner and takes a
15% commission of every hour worked. Handy classifies its cleaners as independent contractors.
Handy cleaners recently brought a class action lawsuit alleging that Handy misclassifies them.
The cleaners seek recognition their status as employees and, consequently, compensation for
missed lunch breaks, minimum wage compensation, reimbursement for business expenses, and
overtime. 125 Handy has argued that its users “choose the Handy platform because it provides
much needed flexibility by allowing them to book whatever jobs best suit them.” 126 In the
company’s terms of service, when referring to its cleaners, it includes five repetitions of an
agreement that they are independent contractors rather than employees, perhaps hoping repetition
can replace solid legal argument.127
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The highest profile battles involve platform drivers. As we have seen, Uber asserts that it
is only a software technology company, which provides a smart phone application that matches
ride-seekers with drivers. 128 Uber subsequently maintains that it,
[D]oes not employ drivers, own vehicles or otherwise control the means and methods by
which a driver chooses to connect with riders . . . it merely provides a platform for people
who own vehicles to leverage their skills and personal assets and connect with other
people looking to pay for those skills and assets.129
While both Uber and Lyft have been firm in classifying their drivers as independent contractors,
others have viewed the arrangement differently. Recent class action suits brought against both
companies by drivers claiming misclassification stress the degree of control and direction the
companies exercise. In the Uber lawsuits, plaintiffs claim that while drivers decide when to turn
on the app in order to get notification about ride requests, drivers “must respond to assignments
generated by the Uber computer system ‘within seconds’ or they will lose the job.” 130 Further,
Uber sets the pickup time, the passenger pay rate, the method of pay, and which passengers the
drivers must pick up.131 The payment goes to a centralized account set up by Uber. 132 Uber has
responded with other factors that support an independent contractor relationship: its drivers
supply the instrumentalities of their work (the cars), are paid by the job, and control their work
hours, their geographic area for pickups, and whether to accept a passenger’s request for a
ride. 133 While Uber drivers own the vehicle and smartphones with the required GPS, in some
instances Uber provides these phones and assists drivers in securing leases for vehicles. In
preliminary hearings in one such lawsuit, Judge Edward Chen stated, “the idea that Uber is
simply a software platform, I don’t find that a very persuasive argument.” 134 Chen found that the
fact that Uber sets the rates by which drivers are paid, screens them, and can terminate them
weighs in favor of finding them to be employees. In a parallel case against Lyft, the court stated,
“people who do the kind of things that Lyft drivers do here are employees.” 135 In June 2015, the
California Labor Commissioner, citing the high degree of control Uber exercises over its drivers,
ruled in an individual hearing that at least one driver of Uber was an employee. 136 In December
2015, a California court issued a final order certifying the Uber drivers case as a class action with
trial set for June 2016.137
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While these mushrooming lawsuits are important, these employment law issues are far
from unique to the platform. Nearly a century after the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
uncertainty about the boundaries between covered employees and independent contractors is as
high as ever. Indeed, the question of employee classification has been recognized as one of the
most difficult and blurry judicial line-drawing techniques in the world of law. 138 Recently,
FedEx lost several class action suits that alleged misclassification of its drivers as independent
contractors. In Alexander v. FedEx Ground Systems, the Ninth Circuit found that FedEx held “all
necessary control” over its drivers. 139 Taxi drivers themselves, operating under the conventional
pre-platform model, have similarly fought over their employment status. In Ali v. U.S.A. Cab
Ltd., the plaintiffs sought class certification of one hundred taxi drivers arguing they were
misclassified as independent contractors with respect to wage and hour law provisions of the
California Labor Code and that, in turn, they were eligible for workers’ compensation
insurance. 140 The court denied certification holding that there was not enough commonality and
raised questions about the fit of all the drivers under the common law test of employee. 141 The
court pointed to the fact that taxi drivers had provided equipment, including cell phones, GPS,
and credit card machines, and that some of the taxi drivers advertised their services via the
Internet, telephone yellow pages, and business cards. 142 These are very similar context-specific
factors that will be considered by the Uber class action court. In effect, these battles over
employment status online and offline are virtually identical. They have to do with the challenge
of line-drawing using multi-factor, common law tests that are often outdated due to new patterns
of work and production. Put differently, the problem is not work via the platform, but rather the
legal definition itself, which is inherently complex.
Contemporary realities may necessitate extending protections we find valuable as a
society—dignity and anti-discrimination principles, whistleblowing protections, insurance and
portable benefits, and occupational health and safety—to all laborers regardless of their
employment status. Rather than insisting on archaic binary definitions of employee versus
independent contractor, creative proposals consider a third category of “dependent
contractor.” 143 Former Chairwoman of the National Labor Relations Board Wilma Liebman has
suggested such a category in a dissenting opinion of the NLRB, noting that Canada and Germany
have statutes protecting such workers. 144 Liebman stated, “Some people are clearly independent
contractors and some are clearly employees, but a third category becomes necessary when you
have people who are borderline,” while being economically dependent on one employer. 145
Again, these questions are challenging but not unique to the platform. As part of the democratic
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process, each society strikes a balance between freedom of contract and employment protections,
fairness, and welfare. The normative values embedded in these choices and their economic
consequences present difficult challenges. They are at the heart of all contemporary debates
about law and economics at large. The platform provides new opportunities to continue these
debates, but it does not transform or transcend these hard choices in any meaningful way.
In 2014, the National Economic Council invited economists studying the platform, key
business leaders, and union leaders to the White House. The agenda was set to think about the
shifts from traditional employment safety nets and new forms of work in the digital world. These
shifting patterns are widespread and not unique to the platform economy. As with the case of
lodging platforms, regulators should develop a preference for solutions that directly address any
negative consequences that may be experienced by the rise of the platform rather than blanket
prohibitive solutions that stymie its development. There are important legislative proposals
designed to increase security in ways other than job stability. 146 As venture capitalist Marc
Andreessen explains, “perhaps the single biggest key enabler for the sharing/gig/1099 economy
in the US: Affordable Care Act of 2010, aka Obamacare.” 147 Indeed, in some ways,
HealthCare.gov has become a human-resources site of the platform economy. 148
The deeper questions about the desirability of turning every aspect and minute of one’s
life, labor, skill and energy into a commodity are more unique to the platform but are likely
unsuitable for legal regulation. Is the platform further destabilizing job security and long-term
employment? Is it a cause or a symptom of the shifting patterns of the labor market? The answer
is both. The rise of the platform is partly due to the decline of full-time, long-term jobs and
cycles of high rates in unemployment. It also represents a shift in preferences in which many
people entering the labor market today prefer flexibility and control over their work-time. The
platform also offers opportunities to profit more directly from one’s labor. Compared to workers
employed through manpower agencies, platform companies allow for a greater share of the pay
to go to the worker.
To close with an optimistic perspective, the platform may also be an opportunity to
connect workers to each other and organize in ways that were not previously available.
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is an online platform that pays independent contractors cents per
task. Millions of individual providers can speak directly to each other unlike ever before when
factory workers had to physically meet at odd hours and picket in front of their manufacturing
plant. Using their online connectivity, its workers have organized a letter-writing campaign to
Amazon’s CEO Jeff Bezos asking him to “see that Turkers are not only actual human beings, but
people who deserve respect, fair treatment, and open communication.” 149 With the technology of
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the platform lowering barriers of entry, it is not impossible to imagine that a critical mass of
discontent among providers, could lead workers to create co-op versions of companies like Uber
and Mechanical Turk. 150 With the energy of creative cause lawyers, it is possible to envision a
transportation platform cooperative which adopts Uber-like technology is essentially driverowned. 151 The platform enables “ridiculously easy group-forming,” which “matters because the
desire to be part of a group that shares, cooperates, or acts in concert is a basic human instinct
that has always been constrained by transaction costs.”152 Online communities have been able to
organize and affect policy in other realms, such as organizing against SOPA/PIPA. Why not
form online communities of platform laborers? One such first initiative is Peers, an organization
for platform economy workers and an advocacy group for the platform economy that provides
services to its members, such as personal-liability protection for homes and replacement cars for
drivers. 153 Peers is planning on expanding its services to include worker’s compensation
insurance. Peers describes itself as a “grassroots organization” with the goal to “mainstream,
protect, and grow the sharing economy,” and already has over 11,000 members and dozens of
corporate partnerships. 154 Other local groups of users are forming to share advice, think about
policy, push risk and responsibilities back from the individual provider to the platform company,
and standardize pricing.

3. The Cloud Economy: Does Aereo Infringe Copyright Law?
In a different field of consumption, media content, the Supreme Court ruled in 2014 that
Aereo, a provider of online streaming technology, was an illegal service operating in violation of
copyright law. 155 While the fight for over-the-air content access is not regularly described as part
of the “sharing economy” in comparison to lodging and transportation apps, Aereo fits well
within the rise of the platform. The new business model in significant part turned on
technological innovation to better leverage the longstanding mandate for free local broadcasting.
The technological innovation was a dynamic sharing of antennas, avoiding the cost of
duplicating hardware from house to house. Aereo provided users access to hardware to capture
broadcast and record content for time-shifting purposes. 156 Over the air content is free for
individual interception. If you buy rabbit ear antennas and place them on your rooftop, you are
free to watch any programming broadcast over the air without cost. Aereo sought to allow
individuals to shift from ownership to access. It developed a bank of tiny antennas in each city in
which it operated, which received local TV broadcast signals, much like old rabbit ears. Every
time a subscriber wanted to watch or record a show, Aereo assigned an individual antenna to the
subscriber. Aereo, viewed through the lens of the platform, was basically a cloud-based
intermediary, enabling people to intercept what they were free to consume directly. The
independent contractors.
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challenge was that, in reality, users who subscribed to Aereo could intercept the local television
package of any city in which Aereo operated regardless of where the user was located. This
meant that someone in California could purchase the local TV package for New York City, no
longer intercepting in the same way that a local clunky rabbit ear would enable without the
intermediary. Aereo’s controls on who could watch a certain television package were very loose;
it required users to check a box stating, “I live in the designated area,” something like Airbnb’s
warning of hosts to respect local zoning laws.
Unsurprisingly then, much like other incumbents challenged by the platform, the
broadcasting networks opposed this new business model and claimed that it violated their rights
to receive transmission fees under the Copyright Act. In 2014, the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled against Aereo, finding that Aereo had violated copyrights held by the networks. 157
The point of contention was whether Aereo's business model constituted a “public performance”
rather than merely enabling individual viewing, and if so, Aereo would be legally required to
obtain permission from the copyright owners of any programs it transmits. 158 The court ruled in a
6-3 decision that Aereo’s business model was essentially like that of a cable television provider,
publicly performing content, despite the great differences in technology. Following the decision,
the company announced it would immediately suspend its services. In November 2014, Aereo
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 159 Another company based on similar technology, FilmOn.com,
has faced the same fate. 160
Aereo was put in a no-win situation. 161 The Supreme Court told Aereo it needed a
license as a cable provider in order to help transmit content to end users, and yet Aereo was
unable to obtain a compulsory license because it was an Internet provider not regulated by the
FCC.162 Thus, Aereo is a striking example of a disruptive platform business facing protective
regulations, outdated legal definitions, and strong industry foes. In 2015, the FCC released a new
proposed rule for public comment on permitting providers like Aereo. 163 It might be too late for
Aereo, 164 but the rule will be impactful as online video services become more popular.
If an Aereo copycat were to emerge under the new FCC rules, with a compulsory license,
the new company might no longer need the geographic restrictions. Many viewers who have
moved around in their life continue to enjoy watching the local television programming from
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their hometown, especially in the areas that Aereo thrived in, such as live sporting events and
live news. Similar to the way other platform companies customize consumption for active users,
Aereo provided these options, changing the nature and the range of options available in the area
of television. Instead of purchasing an enormous cable package in which 70% of the channels
are not watched, and some of the preferred content is unavailable in one’s cable zone, Aereo
provided a cheaper and more fine-tuned option. Moreover, Aereo helped to reduce the barriers to
entry for small-independent broadcasters, who aired niche television content that was ignored by
the major broadcasters and cable companies. These small broadcasters lacked the infrastructure
and equipment to broadcast their channels beyond their locality.
Along with the proposed FCC reforms, post-Aereo, there seems to be positive
developments in enabling innovation in this area without the threat of regulatory liability. In
2015, a California court refused to apply the Aereo decision to Dish Networks’ “DISH
Anywhere” service, which allows users to watch live television on their smartphones or
tablets. 165 The court said that “DISH Anywhere” is different from Aereo because Dish has a
license to transmit the programming while Aereo did not:
The ultimate function of DISH Anywhere is to transmit programming that is already
legitimately on a user’s in-home hardware to a user’s Internet-connected mobile device.
Relying on external servers and equipment to ensure that content travels between those
devices properly does not transform that service into a traditional cable company. 166
Aereo’s plight illuminates the risk for new platform businesses operating in the shadow
of the law. Regulatory politics often decides the winners and losers in society; in this case, the
founders of Aereo took an entrepreneurial risk, and lost in the face of massive established
industry players resistant to disruption and protected by intellectual property law. Line-drawing
in intellectual property law is notoriously hard. Looking ahead, the restrictions placed on
platform companies should be ones that raise consumer welfare, rather than protect incumbent
giants. It is pertinent to note a consensus in the regulatory literature about the importance of
lobbying in determining outcomes as ambiguity in regulatory language is often resolved through
political influence. Comparing the magnitude of the TV networks, as a Goliath that Aereo could
not overcome, Uber may be viewed as a digital unicorn in their lobbying efforts against the taxi
industry, 167 which helps to explain the differences in outcomes of these regulatory battles.

IV. FROM CODE AS LAW TO PLATFORM AS REGULATION
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The key to this shift was the discovery that while we totally distrust strangers, we totally trust
people - significantly more than we trust corporations or governments. – Joel Stein, Time
Magazine 168
Modern digital communications allow sharing to happen across a global village of
consumers and providers, with trust established through electronic peer reviews. -- John
Hawksworth, chief economist at PwC 169
A. Law of the Horse and Law of the Platform
In a short essay for a symposium about the law of cyberspace, Judge Easterbrook began with
the statement:
[T]he
University
of
Chicago
did
not
offer
a
course
in
“The Law of the Horse.” [The Dean] did not mean by this that Illinois specializes in grain
rather
than
livestock.
His
point,
rather,
was
that
“Law and . . .” courses should be limited to subjects that could illuminate the entire law.
Instead of offering courses suited to dilettantes, the University of Chicago offered courses
in Law and Economics, and Law and Literature, taught by people who could be
appointed to the world’s top economics and literature departments--even win the Nobel
Prize in economics, as Ronald Coase has done. 170
For Easterbrook, there was nothing new about regulating the rising World Wide Web.
The same principles that have always been applied to earlier innovation in industry, in
technology, in business throughout history would be applied to this new space. At the same time,
Easterbrook warned that errors in regulation are a great risk especially in the face of technology
that is not fully understood and still in formation. Therefore, he urged policymakers to “not
struggle to match an imperfect legal system to an evolving world that we understand poorly.” 171
Regulatory regimes should be understood as interrelated sets of rules based on the
structure of industries, norms, and social goals. From a “law of the horse” perspective, every new
business transaction can be analyzed with the standard micro-economics transaction costs
principles. For example, Easterbrook may view taxi medallion regulations as a simple case of
guild protectionism, while viewing zoning regulations as plausible responses to externalities. As
demonstrated earlier, the new puzzles of the platform can be analyzed through the traditional
framework of transaction costs analysis, yet a purely “law of the horse” lens would be
incomplete. That is, the developments of the platform cannot be fully captured by analyzing the
terms of each deal digitally struck on a platform company and the efficiencies it creates. The
platform is also transforming the meaning of markets and actors in nuanced ways. Moreover, as
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will be discussed next, the platform lends itself to unique thinking about the right mix of private
and public regulation.
The distinctiveness of the regulatory questions presented by the rise of the platform lie in
the potential these innovations have for disrupting previously accepted legal categories and
regulatory goals. The interplay of interrelated new models, practices, and technology introduced
by the platform requires us to revisit settled legal categories as well as traditional regulatory
solutions and to create predictable and certain regulations for new environments. In this sense, it
is both true that the platform should be understood in light of basic legal principles that existed
before its rise and that, unlike in the case of horses, there is something new and unique about the
law of the platform. In particular, we have seen that the platform business models have created
new hybrids, which regulators must contemplate. Off-on categories such as consumer/business;
employee/freelancer; residential/commercial are in some instances no longer viable as organizing
frameworks. Unique fusions emerge as technology companies centralize some important aspects
of the market transaction, for example, the methods of payment, search and review, and
information and trust. Simultaneously, these companies are decentralizing other fundamental
aspects of the exchange, which are controlled by users, such as pricing on the lodging apps and
work hours on the transportation and cleaning service apps, aspects which determined the supply
infrastructure of the business. What this means for regulators is that rather than a unified single
entity which has traditionally been the object of regulation, transactions are now shaped by
multiple actors, with varying capacities, interests, and needs. The easy cases are where old
categories and concepts, such as tax collection, continue to apply well to new business model.
The hard cases are those which require policymakers to revisit longstanding legal distinctions
and fundamental regulatory goals. The platform economy is therefore a perfect setting to
innovate not only markets but also the legal process.

B. Just an App? Platform Immunity and the Communications Decency Act
In 1996, in the early days of the Internet, the Communications Decency Act (CDA) was
enacted to protect providers of an interactive computer service from civil liability for actions
taken by others. The Act holds that no provider or user of an interactive computer service can be
treated as the publisher or speaker of information provided by another “information content
provider.” 172 An overarching practical question in light of the shift to Web 3.0 is whether
platform business models are protected under the CDA. The Act provides a legal background
against which Internet platforms like Airbnb can operate with some degree of legal certainty as
to their liability for actions their users take. Companies like Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb, based on
their self-definition as purely online tech sites, are arguing that they fall under the definition of
the Act and are thereby protected from civil liability. At the same time, the protection under
CDA is limited. Section 230 grants broad immunity to websites with user-generated content, but
it does not apply to Internet sites that “materially contribute” in branding or shaping the
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transaction. 173 Additionally, section 230 does not apply to websites that materially contribute to
unlawful content.174 Lastly, section 230 protects websites from neither federal criminal
violations nor state regulations. 175
In 1995, a year before the CDA was passed, San Francisco-based programmer Craig
Newmark created Craigslist.org, a website that enables users to post classified ads and interact in
forums. 176 Craigslist’s simple design, modest beginnings, and firm reluctance to sell advertising
space contributed significantly to its success in more than 450 cities worldwide. 177 To date,
Craigslist has avoided every civil charge raised against it under section 230 and has recently
implemented changes to its website in order to avoid future liability. 178 However, a recent case
demonstrates the limits to section 230 immunity. 179 In a recent case against Roommates.com, a
matching site that allows people to find roommates, the court determined that immunity did not
apply because Roommates.com acted as an information content provider when it required
website users to complete questionnaires it had created. That is, Roommates.com contributed to
the content that was placed on its website. The court elaborated that section 230 did not shield
online service providers from civil claims when they materially contribute to the unlawfulness of
the content. The court reasoned that “the Communications Decency Act was not meant to create
a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.” 180
Under this newer analysis, an interactive platform company may not be as fortunate as
Craigslist, but rather may be closer in its characterization to Roommates.com, and certainly may
be liable for any illegal behavior if prosecutors bring criminal charges. There are fine lines
separating conduct that would fall within the exceptions. If the service provider puts branding on
elicited content, supplies the user with tools of the trade, such as GPS devices or equipment to
process transactions, or sets the pricing and the transactional conditions, then it is unclear if the
service provider is still a pure publisher. Still, the CDA largely has acted as a liability shield
from civil litigation, and it is likely that, for the most part, platform companies will continue to
enjoy at least partial immunity under the Act. As a consequence of this immunity, local and state
agencies may focus some of their regulatory and enforcement powers on the users of platform
services, instead of focusing on the actual companies.181 This result is problematic and recalls the
prosecution of end-users who download music or infringe upon patents.182 At the same time, as
we shall see in the next section, platform companies have taken an active role in creating an
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infrastructure that provides grievance mechanisms, insurance coverage, and compliance controls
which together may operate as alternatives to traditional law and regulation.
C. Systems of Stranger Trust
In olden times, villagers built trust through repeated interactions with neighbors.
Familiarity, proximity, reciprocity, continuity, repeat interactions, and immediate accountability
in the small community enhanced compliance. 183 Over time, as exchanges grew in scale and
pace, and as the corporate form took over, this trust was broken and regulators stepped in. The
platform is anything but a return to the small-scale community. The platform is characterized by
its vast ever-expanding scale, which is generated by access and connectivity between strangers.
At the same time, access, scale, repeat interactions, and technological identification combine to
create a new system of stranger trust. The platform is introducing new forms of private
regulation: reviews, ratings, and social network recommendations. These features of the platform
can combine to provide alternatives to traditional regulation. Strikingly, the same technological
advancements that enable the rise of new business models also enable forms of dynamic mass
monitoring and transparency. The confidence that is generated by state permitting, occupational
licensing, and other regulatory requirements can be substituted by crowd confidence.
Web 2.0 marketplace pioneer, eBay, was a leader in creating a “Trust and Safety”
division and, not coincidentally, many next generation start-ups were led by former eBay
insiders.184 The most successful new platform companies are now offering similar services to
increase user protection and confidence. Airbnb, for example, recently stepped up its own “Trust
& Safety” unit when it created an around-the-clock hotline. 185 Airbnb also advises its hosts on
best practices, recently holding its first ever convention with over 1,500 of its most productive
providers. The company has taken the lead in proactively engaging in knowledge sharing,
building best practices, disseminating information about hospitality standards and guidelines, and
supporting meet-ups for hosts.186 From a regulatory compliance standpoint, Airbnb notifies its
users about their obligation to abide by their zoning restrictions, local government laws, and tax
regulations. 187 These notifications also come with a caveat: Airbnb users are warned in the terms
and conditions on Airbnb’s website not to break any laws, but also are required to release the
company from any responsibility for hosts’ compliance with the laws.188 From a liability
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standpoint, as will be discussed in the following subsection, Airbnb has gradually upgraded its
standard insurance policy, which now covers $1,000,000 for loss or damages. 189
In a 2015 PricewaterhouseCooper survey, the majority of respondents reported that they
will not fully trust platform businesses until the questions of their regulation are settled: “When
regulation is solidified, these business models will be fully legitimized—not just by law, but also
in the minds and hearts of consumers.” 190 The following sections examine the developments in
self-regulation of platform companies, which are often triggered by local and federal regulations.
The subsections proceed from the more traditional responses of insurance and background
checks to the newer dynamic feedback systems of ratings and reviews.
1. Insurance
Insurance is the traditional response to risk regulation. After Gawker published a story
about a San Francisco woman whose house was vandalized by Airbnb renters in 2011, Airbnb
added a $50,000 host guarantee against vandalism. 191 Airbnb has since instituted its Host
Protection Insurance program covering up to $1 million primary liability to third party bodily
injury or property damage. 192 Most recently, in October 2015, the plan expanded to cover claims
against landlords and homeowners associations from guests who suffer injury during a stay and
claims against hosts filed by landlords for damages caused by guests to building property.
Airbnb also offers an online Host Protection Resolution Center, a sophisticated and efficient
internal dispute resolution system, which strives to resolve disputes within one week, far quicker
than most public and private grievance processes. 193 When a dispute arises between guests and
renters, parties are referred to the Resolution Center where the parties communicate directly. 194 If
the parties fail to reach an agreement, Airbnb can step in to arbitrate the dispute. In addition, a
number of Airbnb policies serve to prevent disputes before they occur by allowing refunds
within 24 hours in the event the rented accommodation is unacceptable.
Uber similarly has instituted a liability policy of $1 million in coverage for each trip. 195
Other platforms similarly offer insurance for their users. Feastly, for example, a culinary
platform company offers insurance when booking a culinary pop up event through its app. 196
While some of these developments have been initiated by these leading platform companies,
189
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regulators play a role in directing insurance policies on the platform. In Colorado, ride-sharing
companies must offer up to $1 million in liability insurance from the time a driver accepts a
request to the moment when the rider leaves the car. California’s law is more stringent, the law
will require, starting July 2016, ride-sharing companies to provide insurance the moment a driver
turns on the app. 197 Proposed legislation in the state of Washington, similar to California’s law,
would require insurance to be valid as soon as the driver logs into the app.198 In Washington
D.C., the law requires ride-sharing services to provide primary insurance coverage “of at least $1
million per occurrence for accidents” from the time a driver accepts a call until the passenger
exits the car. 199 The U.K. government recently brought insurance leaders together to design good
policies for platform business models.200
In some cases, regulators have brought action against platform companies that have failed
to comply with insurance requirements. RelayRides recently received a cease-and-desist letter
from New York State's Department of Financial Services (DFS), charging RelayRides with
“false advertising and violations of insurance law.” 201 DFS also issued a “scam alert” because
New York insurance law could leave car-sharing users unprotected in the event of an accident. 202
DFS further stated that car-sharing programs may be in violation of existing insurance policies,
which in turn may lead to users losing their coverage. 203 Despite its continued ban from New
York, RelayRides recently rebranded itself under the name “Turo” and has raised funding in
excess of $100 million.204 Turo updated its insurance policy to ensure that all of its travelers are
covered with at least the minimum coverage required by the state in which its users are located.
In addition, like Uber drivers, Turo car owners are provided with $1 million of insurance. 205
Turo now operates in over 2,500 cities and in every state except New York. 206

2. Background Checks
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Background checks of providers are another traditional response to risk. All ride-sharing
legislation imposes safety regulations that include driver background checks and car inspections.
The area for disagreement is how stringent the tests should be. Colorado, for example, imposes
background checks on Uber drivers that are less stringent than those required of taxi drivers. In
Colorado, taxi drivers are subject to fingerprint background checks performed by the Federal and
Colorado Bureaus of Investigation while ride-sharing drivers remain vetted by private companies
that use publicly available data. 207 In 2014, Illinois legislators passed two bills, supported by the
taxi industry to require state-conducted background checks for platform drivers. These bills were
vetoed by the governor, who signed a less stringent background check bill in 2015. 208 New laws
regulating ride-sharing in Virginia209 and Washington D.C. 210 similarly require less stringent
background check requirements. The D.C. law also requires transportation platform companies
to suspend drivers when a customer complains they might have used drugs or alcohol or refused
service on the basis of discrimination. 211
Regardless of state regulation, Uber itself, following media criticisms about the safety of
its service, pre-screens its drivers in all localities using four separate checks: driving history;
criminal background checks, including checks against the National Sex Offender Registry;
vehicle inspections; and medical screening. The Uber driver’s car also undergoes testing. No
Uber vehicle is allowed to be older than a 2004 model. In the area of home services, TaskRabbit,
matching over 30,000 “taskers,” pre-screens and provides background checks for each of its
taskers. In lodging, Airbnb provides digital verification of government IDs of its users.
3. Ratings and Reviews
More revolutionary than insurance and background checks is the dynamic rating and
recording of each transaction on the platform. At Uber, a bilateral record of every transaction is
kept: riders rate drivers who rate riders. Safety is inherent in the design. Credit card and other
identifying information are stored in the system for each customer. The transactions are cashless
and tip-less to reduce theft incentives. The rating system is not only provided to the riders and
drivers, but is also operationalized. Riders or drivers that fall beneath a certain rating are
suspended. Before suspending, Uber also has a consultation process for drops in ratings. All of
these combine to incentivize consistently good service and behavior:
[D]rivers have an incentive to provide great service because at the end of each trip,
passengers rate them on a scale of 1 – 5 (with 5 being the best). Uber drops drivers with
207
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low scores – market incentives tend to yield better service than the “who else are you
going to use” attitude often associated with regulated monopolies such as taxis. 212
At least from initial studies, it appears that these technological safety-by-design systems
implemented by platform companies are effective. For example, a recent study conducted by
Zendrive, a company that looks at driving habits using smart technology, shows that taxi drivers
were 46% more likely to speed than a platform driver, including Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar, and 8%
more likely than “nonprofessional” private driver. 213 Taxi drivers were also 26% more likely
than platform drivers to engage in other unsafe practices such as cellphone use or hardbreaking. 214
Technology allows for a variety of real-time monitoring. Uber and Lyft make the GPS
path visible for the consumer so she can monitor the route the driver choses. These types of
systemic controls mean that incentives on both ends of the deal are aligned. All users of the
platform, whether buyers or sellers, host or guest, driver or rider, errand runner or errand giver,
are interested in a successful transaction to maintain high ratings. The identification, review, and
ratings systems in turn create reciprocal trust that is multi-layered: trust in participants; in value
exchanged; in platform/network. Pre-platform, consumer groups were the watchdog
intermediaries of the market; watchdogging is now crowdsourced.
In many ways, these new forms of regulation are superior to traditional ones. Technology
creates a record of each transaction and digital rating systems can function as a substitute for
personal trust and regulated standards. 215 Insurance focuses on liability when things go wrong.
Background checks are backward looking. But ratings systems are real-time and dynamic. They
are relevant, updated, broad, and deep. Every service, product, and provider are tracked and
reviewed for customer satisfaction. Every customer is also identified, rated, and reviewed. This
creates a true Foucauldian panopticon, or what Eric Goldman has referred to as the “secondary
invisible hand”:
When information is costly, reputational information can improve the operation of the
invisible hand by helping consumers make better decisions about vendors. In this sense,
reputational information acts like an invisible hand guiding the invisible hand…because
reputational information can guide consumers to make marketplace choices that, in
aggregate, effectuate the invisible hand. 216
212
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Above the layer of the reviews of each individual company, specialized consumer review
sites aggregate information and compare reviews across companies, making such sites more
important than advertising. 217 Aggregators include sites like AlltheRoom, which looks at the
various lodging platforms of competitors and presents information about all availabilities. Such
aggregators ensure competitive price and quality. The most interesting aggregators are about
individual providers who are active across various platforms. Increasingly, the platform offers
layers of reputational certification. AirtaskerPRO, for example, offers background checks and
even in-person interviews for anyone providing platform services. Another example, Klout,
offers a reputational capital tool that ranks how influential someone is as a reviewer. 218 Many of
these start-ups seek to expand reputational information of their brands to potential new
consumers through the use of an application program interface (API). APIs allow third-party
developers to integrate the services of another company directly into its application. To illustrate,
Uber expanded its API to include eleven new partners ranging from TripAdvisor and OpenTable
to Starbucks and Hyatt Hotels. 219 Now, a user who makes a reservation at a restaurant through
the OpenTable app or books a room through TripAdvisor can request an Uber driver directly
from those third-party apps. Success in the platform economy often comes down to reaching and
retaining more users, and API utilization exposes potential users to new platforms through the
apps they already use.
Beyond cross-reputational aggregators, platform companies increasingly rely on the
overall social capital that each participant develops online. For example, Airbnb asks users to
provide links on their profile of their social media presence, including Facebook, Google+,
Twitter, and LinkedIn. In essence, ratings are getting another step up – delinked from one digital
service or company, overall creating a multi-layered trust pyramid that becomes richer and
thicker over time (see figure 3). Licensing rose as the consumer protection default of quality
control. But once the technology is in place and a critical mass of participants and points of data
is reached, systems of online trust may be more effective than traditional one-shot regulation.
Figure 3: The Trust Pyramid

RESHAPING THE OFFLINE WORLD 3 (Hassan Masum and Mark Tovey eds. 2011); Liangjun You & Riyaz Sikora,
Performance of Online Reputation Mechanisms under the Influence of Different Types of Biases, 12 INFO. SYS. AND
E-BUS. MGMT. 417, 418 (2014).
217
Paul Resnick et al., Reputation Systems, 43 COMMC’NS OF THE ACM 43, 47 (2000).
218
Alyson Shontell, How A Guy Who Had His Jaw Wired Shut For 3 Months Used The Experience To Build A $200
Million Startup, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 27, 2014).
219
Ryan Lawler, Uber Opens Its API With 11 Launch Partners, Including OpenTable, TripAdvisor, and United
Airlines, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 20, 2014).

Social Capital
Connectivity
Cross-Platform
Reputation
Aggregators
Repeat Reviews on the
Single Platform Company
Technological Real Time Monitoring
First Shot Background Checks and E-Verification

D. Design Around Regulation: Arbitrage, Circumvention, Loopholes & Negative Spaces
We have seen that definitional defiance is central to the business model of the platform. At
the same time, law is all about definitions. A fundamental challenge for regulators is what we
might call the notorious GRC, the Goldilocks Regulatory Challenge: getting law just-right with
neither definitional over-inclusiveness nor under-inclusiveness. Inevitably, there are always
loopholes around definitions that were meant to apply to new circumstances resulting in underinclusive coverage. At the same time, because of the limits of imagination and the inevitable lag
of law behind life, we can expect regulation through false analogies and the insertion of new
circumstances into existing boxes that no longer fit the goals for which they were designed,
inevitably resulting in over-inclusive coverage.
Different bodies of law have dealt with the Goldilocks Regulatory Challenge in varying
ways. First, it is useful to consider the concept of regulatory arbitrage, 220 developed primarily
within scholarship in the context of tax and financial planning:
A perfectly legal planning technique used to avoid taxes, accounting rules, securities
disclosure, and other regulatory costs. Regulatory arbitrage exploits the gap between the
economic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment, taking advantage of
the legal system’s intrinsically limited ability to attach formal labels that track the economics
of transactions with sufficient precision. 221
Regulation imposes costs and if that cost can be reduced, both sides of the transaction,
the buyer and seller or user and provider, can split the savings. The challenge of sorting out
220
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regulatory avoidance from innovation is at the core of debates about the regulation of new
business models:
When new forms are chosen because they reduce transaction costs, legal innovation
presumptively increases efficiency. But when new forms are chosen because they reduce
regulatory costs and increase transaction costs compare to the old structure, we lose
twice: efficiency is reduced by the increase in transaction costs, and the regulatory burden
is shifted onto those who cannot engage in arbitrage. 222
Under regulatory arbitrage, a key to differentiating between regulatory avoidance and
legitimate innovation is to track as closely as possible “the economic substance of deals in
accordance with the policy goals of that regime.” 223 Taking this focus on the substance of the
deal, we have seen that the rise of the platform economy has been driven by technology and
economic efficiencies. If a platform company is avoiding costs that are part of the policy goals of
a legal regime, then regulator can step in to extend requirements to the new business model. Still,
the economic and social logic of the platform, pushing down transaction costs in all stages of the
deal, as well as creating new markets that map onto new preferences and lifestyles, is the primary
raison d'être of the rise of the platform. Therefore, it is largely the case that the substance of the
deal is to create efficiency not directly linked to regulatory avoidance.
Another field of law that can offer insight into the definitional defiance dilemma is
copyright law. This area of law grapples directly with technological progress and new economic
models. The “anti-circumvention” provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”), codified in section 1201 of the Copyright Act, were enacted to stop copyright
infringement by preventing technological advances from defeating anti-piracy protections built
into copyrighted works. 224 Proponents of anti-circumvention laws have argued that it was
necessary to extend existing protections into new forms of consumption and digitization.
Conversely, similar to more recent debates about regulating the platform, critics of these policy
expansions have argued that the push comes from entrenched business interests.225 A central
insight from anti-circumvention critics has been about overreaching. Regulation through anticircumvention prevents not only infringement but also fair use.226 In Aereo, the architecture of
the system was viewed by the court as “over-engineered” and a “Rube Goldberg” model. 227 It
viewed the technological innovation as designed with the sole purpose of avoiding the blackletter copyright law, or in other words, it equated definitional defiance with regulatory
avoidance. The court dismissed the argument that the technological differences made Aereo
legal, revealing an anti-circumvention lens under which the default response for technological
222
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change is expansion of the regulatory coverage. A different concept within intellectual property
may better serve policymakers as they continue to strive for smart regulatory measures while
encouraging innovation and progress. In patent law, unlike the schema of circumvention, which
pervades copyright law, the concept of “design around” offers a default approach that views
definitional defiance as positive. Indeed, patent law “has long recognized the policy justification
of inventing around which is sometimes touted as one of the benefits of the patent system.” 228
Competitors to the patent holder are encouraged to invest their creativity and resources to finding
substitutes to the patented technology. The concept of design around thus offers a productive
lens from which to view innovation: seeking alternative models to dominant competitors should
be assumed to be permissible. Indeed, this shift in the default assumptions of business innovation
fits well with a broader shift in contemporary regulatory theory.
In recent decades, regulation has shifted away from command-and-control to more
participatory modes of rule-making, compliance, and enforcement. If law was once
conceptualized as national, top-down, and sanctioned under the New Deal regulatory model, the
beginning of the twenty-first century has marked a new regulatory paradigm: that of governance.
Against the backdrop of global competition, changing patterns of production, and a declining
commitment to direct legal intervention, policymakers have been experimenting with more
participatory and collaborative models of regulation, in which government, industry, and society
share responsibility for achieving policy goals. Under this model, platform companies can be
viewed as partners, rather than adversaries, of the legal process. The governance paradigm
encourages multiple stakeholders to share traditional roles of governance. Highlighting the
increasing significance of norm-generating nongovernmental actors, the model promotes a
movement downward and outward, transferring responsibilities to states, localities, and the
private sector—including private businesses and nonprofit organizations. Lawmaking shifts to a
reflexive approach, which is process-oriented and tailored to local circumstances. At the same
time, by linking together geographically and materially dispersed law reform efforts, the model
provides innovative ways to coordinate local efforts and to prevent the isolation of problems:
Scaling up, facilitating innovation, standardizing good practices, and encouraging the
replication of success stories from local or private levels become central goals of
government. Legal orchestration is achieved through interpenetration of policy
boundaries, new public/private partnerships, and next-generation policy strategies such as
negotiated rulemaking, audited self-regulation, performance-based rules, decentralized
and dynamic problem solving, disclosure regimes, and coordinated information
collection. 229
One of the key principles under the new model of regulation is the principle of permanent
learning. Max Weber warned that “those who continuously participate in the market intercourse
with their own economic interests have a far greater rational knowledge of the market and
interest [in the] situation than the legislators and enforcement officers whose interest is only
ideal…It is those private interested parties who are in a position to distort the intended meaning
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of a legal norm to the point of turning it into its very opposite.” 230 While Weber emphasizes
learning capacities of regulated industry, under a new governance framework, smart regulation
aids positive evolution of policy and prevents ossification. The advanced technological
capabilities of the platform economy can be revolutionary in aiding this practice by allowing
better data collection and analysis. The business of regulatory agencies becomes more of
regulatory research and development than rule-making and enforcement. 231 With data and
research, we can continue to address the key questions for the law of the platform: are new
business models presenting an opportunity of systematic reduction in transaction costs rather
than simply a shift in rents from incumbents to new firms? Are there new kinds of inequities and
systematic market failures in the rise of the platform? Can some of these failures, such as
asymmetric information, be rectified by the very technology that helps the transactions? Are
there other types of failures, for example externalities of third party safety or the rise of quasimonopolies that require public regulation? The message of new governance is to continue
engaging these challenges with a data-driven multi-stake collaborative framework,
experimenting with different solutions to encourage innovation. In other words, we want to keep
the platform weird, diverse, and fair.

E. Keep the Platform Weird but Equitable: A Digital New Deal
“Why has the Internet proved to be such a powerful engine for creativity, innovation, and
economic growth? A big part of the answer traces back to one key decision by the
Internet's original architects: to make the Internet an open system.”—FCC Chairman
Julius Genachowski 232

A promising aspect of the contemporary law of the platform is that many of the
regulatory questions of Web 3.0, including zoning, consumer protection, residential and
transportation safety, worker rights, and occupational licensing, are traditionally resolved at the
state and local levels. This decentralization lends to a productive natural experiment. Local
governments can learn to see the benefits of collaborating and participating in the platform
economy and to try different paths toward the policy goals with which they are charged. The
Brandeis dream of laboratories of experimentation, with its contemporary iteration in new
governance theory calling for democratic experimentalism, can be realized at this moment of
immense simultaneous innovation across so many industries in so many localities. 233 For
example, cities, as well as private homeowners associations, can position themselves on any
point of the spectrum ranging from platform-friendly to platform-free. 234
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Notably, first-mover platform companies appear to want some light regulation as they
attempt to shape the regulatory field. Indeed, the most successful unicorn start-ups quickly
become incumbents and one way to prevent competition is to accept certain regulatory
requirements that will prove more burdensome on newcomers. Put differently, similar dynamics
of resistance through the insistence of regulatory barriers of entry, which have existed when
platform companies first challenged their offline competitors are likely to happen in the
competition among platform companies. It is possible that Web 3.0 platform companies will be
able to sustain more competition by robust differentiation of services, as opposed to previous
generations of search (Google), social media (Facebook) and retail (Amazon), which have
emerged as quasi-monopolies.
Still, first-mover advantage is key, especially with a business model that relies on scale of
user network for effective supply and demand. As the nature of platform companies continues to
evolve, it is likely that as some of these dominant first-mover companies transition from upstarts
to the “establishment,” new opportunities for disruption will emerge. This has been the trajectory
of many Web 2.0 companies, such as eBay and Amazon, which started as a collection of
individual sellers and small sellers and quickly shifted to include mainstream retail operations.
The platform is similarly transforming in some parts. At Airbnb, many homes are now listed by
professional property managers, which lead private users to voice concerns that raising the
standards and requirements from hosts will deter casual hosts from this leading platform
company. 235 Similarly, Uber drivers are now frequently not simply private individual users but
rather drivers hired by small businesses operating small fleets of cars. 236 There are recent
indications that precisely because of reliance of scale efficiencies, the transportation platform
operates under “winner takes all” conditions, where only a few survive and the rest fall out of the
race. 237
Thus, the platform economy offers us the important insight that business models change
continuously. Business identity shifts from upstart to establishment and with it the interests of
stakeholders with regard to regulatory requirements shift as well. Moreover, traditional offline
competitors are likely to increasingly look like new platform companies as a result of fruitful
disruption of their established long-standing practices. As one analyst commented with Internet
startups and established businesses, “the worlds are actually converging in both directions.” 238
The platform will gradually seek new avenues to commercialize offline and established preplatform industries will inevitably venture to electronic services.
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Most importantly, to understand the continuous evolvement of the platform, data and
sustained research are needed. With their technological sophistication and foresight, platform
companies have taken a leading role in presenting information about their own social and
economic effects. They have introduced studies that suggest positive effects of the platform on
emissions, tourism, and the labor market. 239 These studies are useful but not without the danger
that they are directed, or at least funded, by the interested parties themselves, in large part as a
way to convince legislatures and regulators, alongside the public, to support their growth. Under
new governance theory, as new business models are introduced, regulatory agencies should view
themselves not merely as reactive enforcers, but also as active researchers of these changes. 240
Equity issues should continue to be examined with the expansion of the platform. As we
have seen, the platform, through its access and decentralization of supply, can have a tremendous
positive impact for individuals who wish to capitalize on their previously un-monetized talents
and abilities. A key question for policy will continue to be whether platform companies are
serving the poor and underserved. Some evidence of disparities and inequality is beginning to
emerge with regard to certain services. Both Uber and Lyft are currently facing litigation in
multiple states under the ADA. 241 In one case, an Uber driver allegedly placed a disabled
passenger’s service dog in the trunk, while other drivers are alleged to have sped past riders
waiting in wheelchairs.242 As with its employment disputes, in these cases Uber argues that,
because it is a technology company and not a transportation company, it does not fall under the
purview of the ADA. Uber claims it cannot control the actions of its drivers who refuse to accept
passengers with disabilities because the drivers are independent contractors, and thus, Uber has
no legal obligation to ensure they comply with the ADA. Possibly in response to pending
litigation, however, Uber launched its UberASSIST service to provide senior citizens and people
with disabilities with specially trained drivers. 243
Discrimination may also pervade the renting of homes through Airbnb, but the company
has been making a visible effort to send a clear message about zero tolerance. 244 A new study
conducted by researchers at Harvard Business School found that requests from guests with
distinctively African-American names are 16% less likely to be accepted than identical guests
with distinctively white names. 245 These differences persisted whether the host was male or
female, African-American or white. To reduce discrimination, the authors of the study suggest
that Airbnb, like traditional hotel chains, should require hosts to accept guests without revealing

239

Cannon & Summers, supra note 12.
Lobel, supra note 69; Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 558
(2000).
241
Nina Strochlic, Uber: Disabilities Laws Don’t Apply to Us, THE DAILY BEAST (May 21, 2015).
242
Jen Wieczner, Why the Disabled Are Suing Uber and Lyft, TIME (May 22, 2015), http://time.com/3895021/whythe-disabled-are-suing-uber-and-lyft/.
243
Id.
244
Mike McPhate, Discrimination by Airbnb Hosts Is Widespread, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2015).
245
Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence From a Field Experiment 1
(Harv. Bus. Sch., WPN. 16-069, 2015).
240

Comment [SL2]: I think this is the correct
footnote since another was originally 102 before as
well.

the guest’s name first.246 However, when Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky announced Airbnb’s
Verified Identification program in 2013, he stated:
Access is built on trust, and trust is built on transparency. When you remove anonymity,
it brings out the best in people . . . We believe anonymity has no place in the future of
Airbnb or the sharing economy. 247
These emerging challenges of equity and identity on the platform reveal the inevitable
points of tension that policymakers have always faced. Balancing equality and anonymity,
inclusion and credibility, and safety and privacy is not a new legal challenge. At the same time,
the platform presents new opportunities for monitoring and compliance in order to reach a
desirable delicate balance. Technology-based monitoring can detect misbehavior in more
accurate and fine-tuned ways than broad-brush rules that risk stifling extermination and growth.
As private entities, platform companies can respond swiftly and strongly to incidences of
discrimination. Airbnb’s anti-discrimination policy informs hosts about compliance with federal
and local laws, such as the Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 248 Airbnb
asserts that it “respond[s] quickly to any concerns raised by hosts or guests, and [has] a zerotolerance policy for discrimination on [its] platform.” 249 In April 2015, Airbnb removed a Texas
bed and breakfast from its listings after its host reportedly discriminated against a gay couple. 250
Airbnb refunded the money paid for the booking and paid for a night at the hotel that the couple
ultimately stayed in. 251 The company also issued a statement condemning the incident: “AirBNB
has clear guidelines that a host or a guest may not promote hate or bigotry.” 252 Following this
model, transportation platform companies could also do more with regard to anti-discrimination
detection and enforcement. One of the great advantages of platform companies’ self-regulation
of such issues is the very low costs involved in looking at the data digitally presented and
reacting forcefully against misconduct by disconnecting a driver from the app.
At the same time, there are types of equity issues that may be harder to deal with. While
the mutual rating and review systems widely adopted on the platform have positive implications
for trust and credibility, rating systems may also be affected by biases informed by attitudes on
race, sexual orientation, or disability. 253 Because services like Uber generally contain a photo of
the rider, passengers of color or those requesting service to a poorer neighborhood can be easily
dismissed for non-minority passengers seeking a more upscale destination. Here again, largescale systematic data analysis, drawing on the growing technological sophistication of the
platform, is key. Large-scale data can help inform policymakers about patterns of discrimination
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better than the inevitable arbitrariness inherent in case-by-case discrimination litigation. 254 As
with the other regulatory questions analyzed above, a potential role for regulators would be to
require platform providers to disclose such data and assist with its analysis.

CONCLUSION
The platform economy has incredible potential upsides, but its rise will continue to entail
disruptive effects that are not unambiguously positive. When we fundamentally alter the way that
we interact with others, we create new possibilities for efficiency and for achieving social goals.
At the same time, we face the possibility that market innovation undermines existing policy
choices as well as introduces new avenues for abuse. A deep understanding of the dynamics of
the platform economy, its logic, and the efficiencies it creates, can better guide policymakers in
the vast range of legal fields and legal categories currently unsettled. An ongoing study about the
nature and effects of the rise of the platform will better inform the law in the continuous search
for the optimal balance between innovation and regulation.
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